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Abstract 
The purpose of this research is to study Illinois Governor Bruce Rauner’s Turnaround Agenda, 
which he initially unveiled in 2015 after taking office. His plan was meant to overhaul state 
government with goals that were largely focused on keeping businesses in Illinois and 
convincing new businesses to take root, but proposals like limiting union power and decreasing 
workers’ compensation costs for employers have kept him at odds with Democratic lawmakers 
like House Speaker Michael Madigan and Senate President John Cullerton. This has led to an 
unprecedented budget stalemate in the Capitol as neither side is willing to compromise. Now, 
after two years of gridlock between Governor Rauner and Democrats in the Illinois House and 
Senate, the governor has had to put many items of his original 44-point Turnaround Agenda on 
hold. His wish list is down to seven key points: term limits, workers’ compensation reform, 
education funding reform, a property tax freeze, pension reform, redistricting reform, and 
creating local “employee empowerment zones”. Since the governor has said time and time again 
that the state’s policies and economic climate causes residents and businesses to move to 
surrounding states, for each of the seven items I have outlined the background of the issue, the 
plan put forth by Governor Rauner, and drawn comparisons to the policies in place in 
neighboring states. Through these comparisons, readers can make comparisons with the 
competitor states as to whether these states are more business-friendly, how accurate the 
governor’s claims are, and what Illinois could potentially look like under the laws of its 
surrounding states.  
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Introduction 
After taking office in January 2015, Governor Bruce Rauner unveiled a 44-point plan, 
known as the Turnaround Agenda, to overhaul state government with goals that were largely 
focused on keeping businesses in Illinois and convincing new businesses to move to Illinois. To 
accomplish this, Governor Rauner proposed measures such as limiting union power and 
decreasing workers’ compensation costs for employers, but these proposals have kept the 
governor at odds with Democratic leaders in Springfield, particularly House Speaker Michael 
Madigan and Senate President John Cullerton (Associated Press, 2016). Madigan, Cullerton and 
others say these would hurt middle-class families and the most vulnerable residents in the state. 
This has led to an unprecedented budget stalemate in the Capitol as neither side is willing to 
compromise. Governor Rauner demands his business-friendly measures be included in any 
budget bill and the Democrats have refused, worried about those measures’ effects on workers 
(Burnett, 2016).   
After a yearlong standoff, state lawmakers finally passed a stopgap measure on June 30, 
2016. That stopgap budget simply got state agencies and higher education through the end of 
2016 with partial funding. During the stalemate, spending continued through court orders and 
state law but funding to social services and public universities stopped or was drastically 
reduced. People were laid off and many services were cut or limited. When the temporary budget 
passed, K-12 public schools, a high priority with the governor, were granted full funding. Social 
services across the state were granted $670 million, about 65 percent of what it cost to run them 
from the previous fiscal year, and $720 million went to state facilities for things like utilities, 
food and gas and repairs to state vehicles. Higher education received $1 billion, which for most 
public Illinois universities was about 82 percent of money received for the fiscal year 2015 
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(Garcia, 2017). Of this, $655 million went to the universities and $114 million went to 
community colleges. Additionally, $151 million went to grants for low-income students that 
were promised but never paid the previous year (Garcia, Geiger, Dardick, 2016). Southern 
Illinois University received $54 million of this, with $5.3 million going to spring 2016 Monetary 
Awards Program (MAP) grants (Parker, 2016). MAP grants for the fall 2016 semester were not 
covered, so SIU fronted the costs for students who would normally receive them and will 
continue to do so through the spring of 2017.  
Graduate assistantships have also been declining at SIU due to departments and the 
graduate school having less money to pay for them. For the 3,183 graduate students enrolled in 
the fall 2016 semester, there were 1,215 assistantships offered, university data shows. That pans 
out to one assistantship for every 2.6 students. By comparison, the graduate school enrolled 
4,217 students and granted 1,791 assistantships in Fall 2010 (Southern Illinois University, 2016). 
Over the past 10 years, SIU reduced tenured and tenure track full-time faculty members by 173 
professors, which university officials have attributed to the budget crisis, retirements and 
resignations (Leonard, 2016). SIU’s graduate school enrolled 431 fewer students in 2016 than in 
2015, and total enrollment for the university hit its lowest point since 1965 in the fall 2016 
semester with just 15,987 enrolled. This is a 7.6 percent decrease from 2015 (Sitler, 2016). This 
is not a problem unique to SIU — Eastern Illinois University enrollment went down nearly 13 
percent from 2015 to 2016, Northern Illinois University experienced a 5.5 percent decline in 
enrollment and Western Illinois University had 6.5 percent fewer students in 2016 than the 
previous year (Rhodes, Thayer, 2016). In 2016, Illinois lost about 16,000 freshmen to other state 
higher education institutions and only about 2,000 out-of-state students came to Illinois for 
public college (Strayer, 2016). Faced with uncertainty over the budget stalemate, which appears 
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to have no end in sight, fewer students are willing to make a four-year commitment to Illinois 
public universities.  
These economic woes are not a recent development for Illinois. Since the mid-1990s, 
spending by the state of Illinois has consistently outpaced revenues generated. A 2016 study by 
business economist Thomas Walstrum found that in the 1980s, Illinois was a “low-expenditure, 
low-revenue” state (Walstrum, 2016, p. 1), but starting in the 1990s, revenues stayed low while 
spending rose. This is due in large part to the state’s continually growing unfunded pension 
liabilities. In fact, when not accounting for pension funding, Illinois is a below-average spender 
compared to the state average — although the gap between Illinois spending and that average is 
shrinking, going from about 3.7 percentage points in 1998 to 1.2 percentage points in 2013 
(Walstrum, 2016, p. 2). But because unfunded pensions have grown constantly from 1998 to 
2013 — 1.6 percent of U.S. gross domestic product and 2.0 percent of Illinois gross state 
product, according to an analysis of U.S. Census Bureau data (Walstrum, 2016, p. 3)— it is “no 
longer appropriate to consider Illinois a low-expenditure state” (Walstrum, 2016, p.3). 
When Illinois was a low-expenditure, low-revenue state, maintaining a balanced budget 
was more manageable. However, since the 1980s, Illinois spending has been more than 100 
percent of its revenues, so for over 20 years the budget hasn’t been balanced and debt has grown. 
This is called a “structural deficit” which has plagued Illinois for over three decades.  
When the recession hit in 2008 and 2009, housing prices were particularly affected in Illinois 
because of the state’s heavy reliance on property taxes. Between 2006 and 2012, housing prices 
in Chicago fell by about 35 percent and have since only recovered by about 10 percent. Recovery 
has been slow due to “relatively high unemployment and fiscal problems,” according to a report 
by Swiss Bank UBS in 2016 (Holzhey, Skoczek, 2016, p. 16). This has further decreased 
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revenues for the state (Moser, 2016). According to the 2016 Mercatus Center Ranking of States 
by Fiscal Condition, Illinois is 47th of all 50 states and Puerto Rico on the basis of fiscal health 
in five separate categories. The state is 48th in terms of cash solvency, or having enough money 
to pay its bills. Illinois comes in 41st in budget solvency, or the ability to finance the fiscal year 
with the revenues it generates. Long-run solvency, being able to use assets to cover potential 
state emergencies and financial risks, puts the state second-to-last, and trust fund solvency — the 
level of debt in the state — comes in at 46th. Trust fund solvency includes pension liabilities, 
other postemployment benefits, and state debt. Of the five factors used in the report to measure a 
state’s financial condition, Illinois did the best in service-level solvency, which compares how 
high taxes, spending and revenue are compared to how much money people in the state make. 
Figure 1 
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Here, Illinois ranked 25th, but still — in no category was Illinois above average, and in four-
fifths of the categories the state was in the bottom 10 rankings (Norcross, Gonzalez, 2016, p. 13, 
15, 18, 25, 27).  
Illinois lawmakers, particularly conservative ones, have repeated time and time again that 
the unfunded pensions, workers’ compensation costs, and tax rates in Illinois make the state 
unappealing for businesses and drive residents away in droves.  
In 2011, the Illinois Legislature passed a bill that raised the personal income tax by 66 
percent and the corporate income tax by 45 percent in order to fix the then-$15 billion deficit in 
the state budget. The measure was designed to take the personal income tax from three percent to 
five percent and the corporate income tax from 4.8 percent to seven percent. This bill was signed 
by then-Governor Pat Quinn after passing through both chambers with no Republican ‘yes’ 
votes. Republican lawmakers opposed the package because they said it would drive away 
businesses and residents — and Wisconsin Governor Scott Walker at the time told Illinois 
businesses to “Escape to Wisconsin” where they would feel more welcome. Republicans also 
worried that legislators would use the extra revenue to increase spending and send the state to 
bankruptcy, but Democrats said that wouldn’t happen because the bill included a spending cap 
through 2015 that would send tax rates back to their original rates if the spending limits were 
exceeded (Guarino, 2012).  
During the 2014 campaign between Quinn and Governor Rauner, Quinn advocated for 
the recent tax hikes to become permanent, rather than going back down in 2015, while Governor 
Rauner said they should go back down. Governor Rauner ran ads and released statements 
accusing Quinn of breaking his promises, and said the following in a March 2014 press release: 
“He promised his tax hike would be temporary. Today, he broke that promise, too, and is 
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doubling down on his failed policies” (Finke, 2014). Governor Rauner’s platform was initially 
that the hikes should go back down immediately in 2015, but in September of 2014, two months 
before the election was to take place, he changed his position by saying the tax rates should 
gradually go back to their original rates during his four-year term and the state should decrease 
its spending (Finke, 2014). In Quinn’s 2014 budget address, he didn’t mention Governor Rauner 
by name but said “Those who are telling you that Illinois can tax less and spend less and still 
expect to fund education are simply not telling you the truth” (Finke, 2014).  
Governor Rauner was the eventual victor in this debate and the 2014 election. In January 
2015, the personal income tax rate dropped from 5 percent to 3.75 percent and the corporate 
income tax rate went from 7 percent to 5.25 percent (Sector, Pearson, 2015). Illinois’ corporate 
income tax includes the 5.25 percent flat rate for federal taxable income and 2.5 percent personal 
property replacement tax on net income for “traditional corporations, S corporations, LLCs, and 
partnerships to pay a personal property replacement tax” (Steingold, 2013). For this reason, the 
state’s corporate income tax rate is often listed as 7.75 percent. These are the current rates and, as 
a point of comparison, the tax rates of surrounding states are as follows:   
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Figure 2 
Chart 1 
Illinois Tax Rates (percent) vs. Surrounding States 
State 2016 Income 
2016 Corporate 
Income 2015 State & Local Sales 2016 Property 
Illinois 3.75 7.75 8.19 2.32 
Indiana 3.3 6.5 7 0.86 
Michigan 4.25 6 6 1.78 
Wisconsin 7.65 7.9 5.43 1.96 
Iowa 8.98 12 6.78 1.49 
Missouri 6 6.25 7.81 1.02 
Kentucky 6 6 6 0.85 
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(Data via The Tax Foundation (Walczak, 2015, 2016, Kaeding, 2016)  
As state politicians frequently point out, Illinois has also been experiencing a net 
population loss for many years. In 2016, the net loss was over 100,000 people, which was the 
third year in a row that Illinois lost more residents than any other state (Jordan, 2016). Illinois 
was still the fifth most populous state in 2016, but if record numbers continue to change, soon 
this may not be the case. Every other Midwestern state’s population showed increases (Craver, 
2016). 
The political climate is also a factor in the proposed reforms. Illinois has long been seen 
as one of the most politically corrupt states in the country. It reaches as far back as the mid-
1800s when Governor Joel Aldrich Matteson was indicted for trying to make away with 
$200,000 of stolen government scrip (Suddath, 2008) to 2009 when Rod Blagojevich became the 
first Illinois governor to be impeached, facing multiple corruption charges that included 
attempting to sell the U.S. Senate seat of then-President-elect Barack Obama (Associated Press, 
2011). Four of the last seven governors of Illinois have gone to prison. Bruce Rauner tapped into 
voter frustration over this political and the fiscal climate during the 2014 gubernatorial election 
against incumbent Pat Quinn, who had served for six years as governor. Quinn was defeated by a 
surprising five-point margin (Hinz, 2014), after many pollsters predicted either a Quinn victory 
or a very narrow win for Governor Rauner (Real Clear Politics, 2014). Voters apparently decided 
they were ready for the “new direction” Governor Rauner had promised (Riopell, 2014).  
After two years of gridlock between Governor Rauner and Democrats in the House and 
Senate, the governor has had to put many items of his original Turnaround Agenda on hold. He’s 
down to seven main areas of focus: term limits, workers’ compensation reform, education 
funding reform, a property tax freeze, pension reform, redistricting reform and creating local 
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“employee empowerment zones”. For each item, this report will outline Governor Rauner’s 
justification for the reform, his proposal, how his proposal compares with legislation and policies 
other states already have in place and any potential impacts of implementing his measures. 
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Term Limits 
Illinois is seen as a notoriously politically corrupt state, as outlined in this report’s 
introduction. Some see term limits as a cure for the problem, but as this section will detail, there 
is not necessarily connection between the two. Governor Rauner pushes for legislative term 
limits to bring "new faces and new ideas" to fix the problem of "entrenched political power" in 
Springfield, as he said in a July 2016 speech (Pearson, 2016). As a solution, Governor Rauner’s 
Turnaround Agenda states: 
“Fifteen other states impose term limits on state legislators. Most states impose a 
limit of eight to 12 years in each chamber. It’s time for Illinois to adopt legislative 
term limits” and “The Illinois Constitution should be amended to limit a 
Representative or Senator from holding that office or combination of those offices 
for more than 10 years” (Rauner, 2014, p. 17).” 
If a term limit amendment was passed, it would go before voters as a statewide 
referendum on the 2018 ballot and if passed, it would go into effect in 10 years (2028) because 
that would be the first year the incumbents serving when the limits were made law would no 
longer be eligible to run for re-election under the enacted term limits.  
The governor also takes issue with the lack of competition in Illinois politics, saying that 
two-thirds of the races in the November 2016 elections were uncontested. He said in a July 2016 
statement: "That's not democracy. That's a rigged system.” (Pearson, 2016). Governor Rauner 
says lawmakers are too worried about getting more power and enacting the will of interest 
groups rather than voters. On January 12, 2017 the Illinois Senate passed as a component of the 
“grand bargain” a 10-year leadership term limit for the Senate President and the Senate Minority 
Leader, but it has not put one in place for regular legislative terms. The Illinois House terms, 
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both for leaders and regular legislators, remain limitless, unless the House agreed to change its 
own rules for selecting its leaders (Hinz, 2017).   
As a point of comparison, per the National Conference of State Legislators, the following 
states have legislative term limits: 
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Chart 2 
 Term Limits for State House of Representatives 
State Limit (Years) Year Enacted Year of Impact 
Arizona 8 1992 2000 
Arkansas 16* 1992 1998 
California 12* 1990 1996 
Colorado 8 1990 1998 
Florida 8 1992 2000 
Louisiana 12 1995 2007 
Maine 8 1993 1996 
Michigan 6 1992 1998 
Missouri 8 1992 2002 
Montana 8 1992 2000 
Nevada 12 1996 2010 
Ohio 8 1992 2000 
Oklahoma 12* 1990 2004 
South Dakota 8 1992 2000 
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1.1. *These limits represent the total number of years a legislator may serve in the
House or the Senate--years may be split between the two chambers (Underhill, 
2013).  
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Chart 3 
 Term Limits for State Senate 
State Limit (Years) Year Enacted Year of Impact 
Arizona 8 1992 2000 
Arkansas 16* 1992 2000 
California 12* 1990 1998 
Colorado 8 1990 1998 
Florida 8 1992 2000 
Louisiana 12 1995 2007 
Maine 8 1993 1996 
Michigan 8 1992 2002 
Missouri 8 1992 2002 
Montana 8 1992 2000 
Nebraska 8 2000 2006 
Nevada 12 1996 2010 
Ohio 8 1992 2000 
Oklahoma 12* 1990 2004 
South Dakota 8 1992 2000 
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1.2. *These limits represent the total number of years a legislator may serve in the
House or the Senate--years may be split between the two chambers (Underhill, 
2013). 
It is noteworthy that the only states adjacent to Illinois on either of these lists are 
Missouri and Michigan.  It is also noteworthy that only Arkansas, California and Oklahoma split 
their term limits between the House and Senate, meaning lawmakers could simply switch over to 
the other chamber when they hit their limit in one chamber. Though theoretically, term limits 
would bring in the “fresh faces” Governor Rauner wants in the legislature, in many states that 
already have them, this hasn’t happened because “lawmakers can legally subvert the spirit of 
restrictions by ping-ponging between legislative chambers” (Jones, 2017). Also, there is little 
evidence that newer legislators are less corrupt than the veterans. A 2004 study from the NCSL 
and the University of Maine stated that term limits caused Maine lawmakers to be “more partisan 
and ideological than in the past” (Powell, Jones, 2004, p. 38) and that an increase in splinter 
groups and caucuses made it more difficult for leaders to pull their members into one group 
together. Term limits can also give more power to lobbyists as less experienced lawmakers rely 
more on lobbyists to explain how past legislators voted on similar issues. Some say term limits 
also shift power to the governor and the executive branch as the legislature is less experienced 
and in need of more guidance. Chris Mooney, director of the Institute of Government and Public 
Affairs at the University of Illinois Springfield, said in 2013 that term limits are favored by 
governors because they make the legislature weaker, thereby making governors stronger as 
lawmakers increasingly need to yield to their influence. Mooney also found that term limits 
decrease institutional knowledge within the legislature, thereby decreasing the effectiveness of 
individual lawmakers and the body altogether (Mooney, 2013).  
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In 2015, poll and data analysis website FiveThirtyEight conducted a study of political 
corruption in each state based on four factors: corruption convictions, convictions per capita, 
reporter ratings (wherein reporters were asked for corruption analysis within their own states) 
and lack of stringent laws. Since a major argument for term limits is that they prevent corruption 
in state government, here is a breakdown of how Illinois’ corruption ranking compares to each 
state with legislative term limits:  
Chart 4 
State Corruption 
Convictions 
Convictions 
per Capita 
Reporter 
Rankings 
Lack of 
Stringent 
Laws 
Average of 
All Four 
Rankings 
Illinois 3 6 2 40 12.75 
Arizona 24 38 10 22 23.5 
Arkansas 28 30 26 24 27 
California 2 34 9 47 23 
Colorado 31 44 36 19 32.5 
Florida 4 18 13 34 17.25 
Louisiana 9 1 (No data received) 15 8.33 
Maine 40 27 38 5 27.5 
Michigan 14 32 47 7 25 
Missouri 18 23 25 36 25.5 
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Montana 36 8 24 21 22.25 
Nebraska 45 43 40 46 43.5 
Nevada 41 45 12 9 26.75 
Ohio 7 14 20 18 14.75 
Oklahoma 20 12 23 13 17 
South Dakota 34 4 44 2 42 
(Table data from Enten, 2016). 
When an average of all four corruption rankings is taken, Illinois still comes out on top as 
the most corrupt state against all those with legislative term limits (except Louisiana, which is 
missing one data point), but is trailed by just two points by Ohio. California is one of two states 
that have had legislative term limits for the longest period of time, and is ranked second in 
corruption convictions out of all 50 states. The other, Maine, is ranked 5th in a lack of stringent 
corruption laws. Though it is hard to say which corruption factor should hold the most weight, it 
would seem term limits do not have a direct causation with corruption or a lack of it. Unlimited 
legislative terms, then, do not appear to be the root of the problem.  
The following chart shows a comparison between the term limited states’ corruption 
levels and fiscal condition rankings (all data from Enten, 2016 and Norcross, Gonzalez, 2016, p. 13): 
Chart 5 
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Chart 6 
State 
Average Corruption 
Level (Enten, 2016) 
Ranking of States by Fiscal Condition (Norcross, 
Gonzalez, 2016)  
Louisiana 8.33 33 
Illinois 12.75 47 
Ohio 14.75 11 
Oklahoma 17 8 
Florida 17.25 6 
Montana 22.25 10 
California 23 44 
Arizona 23.5 31 
Michigan 25 35 
Missouri 25.5 14 
Nevada 26.75 13 
Arkansas 27 28 
Maine 27.5 43 
Colorado 32.5 22 
South Dakota 42 5 
Nebraska 43.5 2 
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Based on this information, there does not seem to be an obvious correlation between state 
corruption and fiscal condition. Although the two most corrupt states, Louisiana and Illinois, 
rank low financially, Maine, which is in the bottom fourth of corruption in states with term 
limits, is ranked 43rd in fiscal condition. Again, Maine has had term limits for the longest period 
of time of any other state except California. Illinois’ term-limited neighboring state of Michigan 
is in the bottom half of rankings for state financial condition. Missouri seems to fare better 
fiscally, achieving the 14th best financial state in the country, but again, with the data showing 
varying degrees of financial success and anti-corruption, it is impossible to say if this is due to 
term limits or not. If the governor and legislators seek to end corruption in Illinois and improve 
state financial conditions, it seems that implementing legislative term limits may not be the cure-
all.  
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Workers’ Compensation 
In the 2016 Oregon Workers’ Compensation Premium Rate Ranking Summary, Illinois 
ranked the 8th highest in the nation (including Washington D.C.) for workers’ compensation 
premiums, with an index of $2.23 per $100 of payroll. Our surrounding states are lower, in some 
cases drastically — Iowa ranks 24th with an index of $1.86, Michigan is 34th at a $1.57 index, 
Kentucky is 36th with an index of $1.52, Ohio comes in 40th with a $1.45 premium, and Indiana 
— one of Governor Rauner’s main models — is 50th with just $1.05 per $100 on the average 
payroll (Day, Manley, & Dotter, 2016, p. 2). According to Governor Rauner’s Turnaround 
Agenda, these high costs for Illinois businesses drive jobs to other states (Rauner, 2014, p. 4) 
The major problem, Governor Rauner says, is that Illinois has very low causation 
standards for claim payouts. There is no bigger bone of contention in the workers’ compensation 
conflict than the dispute over causation. “Causation” here refers to the burden an employee bears 
of proving that an injury happened on the job or in the course of employment. It must be shown 
that the job was primarily responsible for the injury sustained (Hein). In 2011, legislative reforms 
were passed to the existing workers’ compensation law to increase causation standards by adding 
the American Medical Association guidelines to the factors that determine permanent partial 
disability (PPD). The AMA Guides are now one of five elements the Illinois Workers' 
Compensation Commission uses to resolve disputes between employees and employers during 
trials. The factors are written in the Workers Compensation Act as follows:  
“In determining the level of permanent partial disability, the Commission shall base its 
determination on the following factors: (i) the reported level of impairment pursuant to 
subsection (a); (ii) the occupation of the injured employee; (iii) the age of the employee 
at the time of the injury; (iv) the employee's future earning capacity; and (v) evidence of 
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disability corroborated by the treating medical records. No single enumerated factor shall 
be the sole determinant of disability. In determining the level of disability, the relevance 
and weight of any factors used in addition to the level of impairment as reported by the 
physician must be explained in a written order.”  
Subsection (a) in the Act reads: “The most current edition of the American Medical Association's 
"Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment" shall be used by the physician in 
determining the level of impairment” (Illinois Workers' Compensation Act, p. 35). 
The introduction of the AMA guidelines was also intended to provide more uniformity in PPD 
awards, but the 2011 legislation that added the Guides to the Act is too vague and subject to 
interpretation (Rusin, 2014, p. 24). Since the guidelines are also typically more “conservative” in 
determining PPD, as Governor Rauner says, making their use mandatory should reduce awards 
(Rauner, 2014, p. 4).  
A major concern that arises from primarily using AMA Guides in workers’ compensation 
cases over the other four factors is that AMA Guides are used to determine impairment, not 
disability. Impairment, as defined in the sixth and latest addition of the AMA Guides to the 
Evaluation of Permanent Impairment, is “A significant deviation, or loss of use of any body 
structure or body function in an individual with a health condition, disorder, or disease”  
Disability is defined as “Activity limitations and/or participation restrictions in an individual 
with a health condition, disorder, or disease” (Rondinelli, 2007, Gatchel, 2014, p. 301). 
Therefore, impairment cannot be used to determine the level of disability that arises from an 
injury regarding certain jobs. If a professional guitarist and a mailman both lose a finger in the 
course of their employment, the impairment level would be the same under the AMA Guides, but 
the mailman would not have as large a disability as the guitarist because the mailman can still 
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perform his/her job duties, while the guitarist would be unable to perform his/her job duties and 
is totally disabled.  
In the Turnaround Agenda, Governor Rauner makes the following proposal to reform the 
workers’ compensation standards for the state:  
“The language that limits the Commission from using only one of the five factors to 
determine PPD should be eliminated. This will allow (though not mandate) a 
Commissioner to solely base an award on the AMA guidelines.The language that limits a 
Commissioner to only considering a treating physician’s medical records should also be 
eliminated. Instead, the Commission should be able to review both a treating physician’s 
and an independent medical examiner’s records to provide a more balanced view of the 
medical condition” (Rauner, 2014, p. 4).  
Many dispute this reform, saying that the AMA Guides themselves state the difference between 
impairment and disability and that the Guides’ impairment ratings were never intended to be the 
the sole determining factor in PPD cases.  A report from Capron & Avgerinos, P.C., a personal 
injury law firm based in Chicago, states the following:  
“The 6th edition of the AMA Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment notes 
that ‘the relationship between impairment and disability remains both complex and 
difficult, if not impossible to predict…’ Further, the guide states that ‘in disability 
evaluation, the impairment rating is one of several determinants of disablement.’ The 
Guides also clarify the difference between impairment and disability. According to the 
AMA Guides, impairment is a ‘significant deviation, loss, or loss of use of any body 
structure or body function in an individual with a health condition, disorder or disease.’ 
28 
Disability, however, is defined as the ‘activity limitations and/or participation restrictions 
in an individual with a health condition, disorder, or disease.’” 
To use the Guides as the sole determining factor would be a “detriment to the injured worker”, it 
goes on to say, and giving a Commissioner the discretion to only base their decision off the 
AMA Guides would result in less uniformity in awards (Capron, Averginos, 2016). 
However, another personal injury defense firm, Rusin Maciorowski & Friedman Ltd., 
argues that the AMA Guides should be the primary factor, unless another of the four 
determinants makes a significant difference in the case:  
“A fair reading of the statute implies that if the other factors significantly alter the 
impairment rating, then they should be considered in granting permanent partial disability 
in excess of the impairment rating. Not surprisingly, there has been significant 
controversy concerning this section. For the most part, impairment ratings as calculated 
pursuant to the AMA guidelines are remarkably lower than what the Illinois Workers’ 
Compensation Commission has routinely awarded for permanent partial disability” 
(Rusin, 2014).   
This report says the application of AMA Guides should result in more uniformity in decision 
making, not less, because “the proper application of the AMA guidelines really is not subject to 
that much variation. Most doctors, if they properly apply the AMA guidelines to a claimant will 
end up with the same or a very similar impairment rating. The guidelines intentionally are not 
open to that much interpretation, subjectivity and variation. Depending on the evaluator, there 
could a variation in impairment ratings between doctors of 1 percent to 3 percent, but it is 
unlikely that there would be a major difference in an impairment rating from petitioner’s expert 
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or respondent’s expert” (Rusin, 2014). Rusin says there is “no question” that implementing the 
use of the AMA Guides has lowered awards for PPD:  
“The Commission has not given any specific general direction to the arbitrators on what 
they should award for PPD. However, so far we are seeing that current PPD awards are 
being reduced by approximately 20 percent to 30 percent from where they used to be in 
similar situations prior to September 1, 2011” (Rusin, 2014).  
The reason the awards haven’t been reduced by a higher percentage is that the Commission still 
tends to base their decisions on past case precedents rather than applying the AMA Guide’s 
impairment ratings. Not every case presented to the Commission supplies an independent 
medical examination (IME) result (which is where a doctor would give a patient an impairment 
rating) with their evidence. In a November 28, 2011 memo, the Illinois Workers Compensation 
Commission Chairman Mitch Weisz said “An impairment report is not required to be submitted 
by the parties with a settlement contract. If an impairment rating is not entered into evidence, the 
Arbitrator is not precluded from entering a finding of disability” (Illinois Workers' 
Compensation Commission, 2011). Rusin says a continuation of these practices will result in 
workers’ compensation payouts staying high, and therefore costs for businesses staying higher 
than they would otherwise be:  
 “The AMA Guides should serve as the primary basis for the percentage award of 
permanent partial disability. Some increase in the percentage award of permanent partial 
disability should be considered in the event that the other four factors set forth in the 
statute create a basis for a finding of disability in excess of the impairment rating” (Rusin, 
2014).  
30 
To study how the Illinois Workers’ Compensation Commission (WCC) is applying (or 
not applying) the AMA Guides in cases, see Appendix A.  
As a point of comparison, Governor Rauner frequently uses Indiana as an example of a 
neighboring state that is drawing businesses away from Illinois because of its workers’ 
compensation premiums, which are among the lowest in the country. Illinois has the 8th highest 
workers’ compensation premiums, while Indiana has the second-to-lowest. Indiana’s system is 
structured differently, and in a way that often leads to smaller award amounts for injured workers 
and, consequently, lower costs for businesses. Here is how the two acts compare:  
Use of AMA Guides:  
In Illinois, AMA Guides are used along with four other factors in determining 
awards given to claimants:  
“The Commission was and is required to use a case-by-case approach to evaluate 
the effect of a disability on the life of the particular worker before it,” according 
to a 2013 report by T. Fritz Levenhagen at the Levenhagen Law Firm, P.C. 
(Levenhagen, 2013, p. 2).  
In Indiana, AMA Guides are the sole determining factor in workers’ 
compensation claims. The Workers’ Compensation Act of Indiana states: 
“[Permanent Partial Impairment] Examinations by Employer’s Physician; Second 
Opinions:   
An injured employee’s PPI is most often assessed by the treating physician.  
Physicians use the American Medical Association’s Guides to the Evaluation of 
Permanent Impairment in evaluating the employee’s impairment rating.  A PPI 
rating is stated by the doctor in terms of a percentage of loss or loss of use of a 
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body part or the whole body, for example “The employee has suffered a loss of 10 
percent to the hand,” or “The employee’s impairment is 25 percent to the whole 
body” (Indiana Workers’ Compensation Act, section IX).  
Choice in physician:  
 The Illinois Workers’ Compensation Act states: 
“The employee may at any time elect to secure his own physician, surgeon and 
hospital services at the employer’s expense. The employee shall have the right to 
make an alternative choice of physician from such Panel if he is not satisfied with 
the physician first selected” (Illinois Workers’ Compensation, p. 24).  
The Indiana Workers’ Compensation Act states:  
“With few exceptions, the employer/insurance carrier has the right to direct 
medical care in Indiana.  In most cases, the employer provides a physician, free of 
charge, for the treatment of an employee’s injuries. If the employer fails to 
provide ‘reasonable and necessary’ medical treatment, the employee may go to 
any physician. However, if the employer/carrier refuses to pay for the treatment, 
the employee or the medical provider may have to file with the Board to seek 
reimbursement” (Indiana Workers’ Compensation Act, section VII).  
Waiting period for benefits: 
The Illinois Workers’ Compensation Commission Handbook on Workers’ 
Compensation and Occupational Diseases states:  
“[Temporary total disability] is not paid for the first three lost workdays, 
unless the employee misses 14 or more calendar 
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days due to the injury” (Illinois Workers' Compensation Commission, 
2013, p. 4).  
Indiana Workers Compensation Handbook states:  
“When a compensable injury renders an employee unable to work, 
compensation for lost wages is paid starting on the eighth day.  However if 
the employee is still disabled, on the twenty-second day after the injury, 
the employee will receive compensation for the first seven days. 
The first weekly installment of compensation is due fourteen (14) days 
after the disability begins.  Not later than fifteen (15) days from the date 
that the first installment is due, the employer/carrier must tender to the 
employee an Agreement to Compensation, along with compensation due, 
or request an extension of time.  Ind. Code §22-3-3-7(b)” (Indiana 
Workers’ Compensation Act, section VIII ).  
Conclusion 
The Indiana system is much more favorable toward the employer and not the employee in 
these disputes. It is argued that a physician using AMA Guides is more equipped to gauge an 
employee's impairment than an arbitrator, and therefore the ratings supplied by doctors grant a 
reliable determination of how much an injured worker should be awarded. But the AMA Guides 
are used only in determining impairment,  and therefore cannot judge how much an injury 
actually impacts an employee’s job. In Illinois, the AMA Guides are only one of five 
determining factors, which is seen as being more favorable to employees because the other four 
factors can help determine how their ability to do their job may be compromised due to an injury. 
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The rating provided by a physician can be disputed through the claimant’s other medical records 
and testimony, and the AMA Guides state their purpose as being “to generate more certainty and 
uniformity in the rating of permanent impairment” (Levenhagen, 2013, p. 3) but these 
arbitrators’ decisions show that there is not a great deal of uniformity in these cases.  Some argue 
that the AMA Guides should be the primary determination, and if any of the other four factors 
significantly alter the finding of a physician then, those four factors should given more weight 
over the physician’s rating. This could lead to lower payouts and alleviate the high costs of 
workers’ compensation on employers while still providing injured employees the chance to have 
higher payouts if other factors are significant in their case.  
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Education Funding Reform 
Recent reports show a significant disparity in funding between different public school 
districts in Illinois. In the 2015 Funding Gap report from the Education Trust, it states the 
following: “In six states, the highest poverty districts receive substantially fewer state and local 
funds than their lowest poverty counterparts. By far the largest gap is in Illinois, where the 
highest poverty districts receive nearly 20 percent less state and local funding than the lowest 
poverty districts. To close achievement gaps, schools need funding that is equitable — funding 
that accounts for the fact that it simply costs more to educate low-income students, many of 
whom start school academically behind their more affluent peers” (Ushomirsky, Williams, 
2015). Funds are not allocated progressively, the report says, which results in the poorest 
districts receiving 19 percent fewer dollars than the wealthiest districts.  
This can be traced to another key item on Governor Rauner’s agenda, property taxes. The 
Illinois State Constitution states: 
“The State shall provide for an efficient system of high quality public educational 
institutions and services. Education in public schools through the secondary level shall be 
free. There may be such other free education as the General Assembly provides by law. 
The State has the primary responsibility for financing the system of public education” 
(Ill. Const. art. X, § 1.) 
However, according to the Illinois School Funding Reform Commission’s 2016 overview of 
education local, state and federal funding, in 2016 local sources accounted for 64.9 percent of 
funding for schools while state sources accounted for just 26.5 percent (Illinois State Board of 
Education, 2016, p. 2). When the state’s contribution is so low, school districts are forced to raise 
their property tax levies or cut programs and personnel. There is also a problem with the Illinois 
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income tax system because it is required by the Illinois Constitution to be a flat rate instead of 
graduated, as the federal income tax is (Ill. Const. art. IX, § 3). This places a disproportionate 
burden on those in the lowest tax brackets. General State Aid (GSA) is set up to distribute funds 
based on property taxes and the income of the population within the district. Districts with lower 
property wealth are meant to receive more GSA (Illinois State Board of Education, 2016, p. 11). 
However, there are certain loopholes in the GSA funding formulas that can be used by districts 
to underreport their wealth.  
One of these has to do with tax-increment financing, which lets towns borrow against their future 
tax revenues to invest in immediate projects and developments. According to Illinois Policy, this 
means school districts can not report over $18 billion in property value in certain economic 
zones (Klingner, 2014). The district’s average daily attendance is also used in determining 
additional funding for schools showing a decline in enrollment (General State Aid Overview – 
February 2017, 2017, p. 11).  
In the absence of state funding, the property tax has become increasingly depended upon 
by school districts. This means high-income areas with higher property wealth, where students 
are already typically at an advantage in terms of resources, have been able to spend more on 
hiring good teachers and extracurricular activities, while those low-income districts with lower 
property wealth are forced to cut corners. This has helped to create an achievement gap between 
low and high income students in the state. According to a 2016 report from Illinois Vision 20/20, 
an educational policy organization advocating for equitable funding in Illinois, “income status 
accounts for 54 percent of the variance in the percentage of students meeting Illinois standards in 
ELA and math at the district level. Illinois’ inadequate funding structure reinforces the 
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disadvantages already found among children living in communities with low property values” 
(The State of Illinois Education, 2016).  
Figure 3 
(Chart from Illinois Vision 20/20) 
The overreliance on property taxes is exacerbated by the state financial crisis. In July 
2016, the Commission on Government Forecasting and Accountability analyzed the stopgap 
budget agreement passed by lawmakers in June and reported that the state would be at a $10 
billion deficit by the end of 2016 (O’Connor, Tareen, 2016). This comes from the state’s 
unfunded pension liabilities and other debt-services, as well as the long standing structural 
deficit. These unpaid bills mean the state has to allocate about 15 percent of the general fund to 
the debts, leaving less in General State Aid for school district allocation and forcing schools to 
rely on property taxes more heavily.  
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Governor Rauner’s proposed fix for this problem in the Turnaround Agenda states: 
“Student and Career Success Package:  
Increase state support for pre-K-12 education, especially for low-income families. 
Give local school boards the ability to modify overly burdensome unfunded 
mandates. 
Lift the arbitrary cap on public charter schools, reduce funding disparities for 
public charters and provide more high-quality educational options to students 
through tax credit scholarships” (Rauner, 2014, p. 26).   
After resisting educational funding reform for nearly a year and calling it a distraction 
from budget talks, Governor Rauner appointed a commission of lawmakers in July and gave 
them a February 1st deadline for their proposal on how best to change the way state funds are 
doled out to schools (Geiger, 2016). The report said the state needs to spend at a minimum $3.5 
billion over the next ten years for all districts to meet or exceed their adequacy targets (Illinois 
School Funding Reform Commission, 2017, p. 4). The state should also be allocating more 
money to districts with more high poverty-level students, students with disability and English 
language learners, according to the report. It was also determined that high-poverty districts 
receive an average of 20 percent fewer state dollars than wealthy districts. The commission 
decided Illinois should establish a “a unique funding target (“adequacy”) for each district that 
reflects the particular needs of children in that district and will lead to improved outcomes for 
students” (Illinois School Funding Reform Commission, 2017, p. 6). However, the report didn’t 
delve into any specifics of how best to do this, providing little in the way of dollar amounts or 
formulas that the General Assembly might use. There were also topics listed that the 25-member 
commission was unable to reach agreement on, such as relieving school districts from the 
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mandates imposed on them by the state or whether parents who send their children to private 
schools should receive tax credits. Some lawmakers on the commission, such as longtime 
funding reform advocate Senator Andy Manar, D-Bunker Hill, expressed disappointment that the 
commission was unable to introduce a funding reform bill before the General Assembly, but 
Manar went on to say the Rauner administration should be introducing legislation on the issue as 
well (Finke, 2017).  
Reps. Barbara Flynn Currie, William Davis, Rita Mayfield and Emily McAsey, all 
Democrats wrote a letter addressed to Dr. Elizabeth Purvis, Governor Rauner’s Secretary of 
Education and the head of the Commission. The letter stated that the report Purvis and the 
Commission released did not take into account the state’s overreliance on property taxes to fund 
public schools and did not go into enough specific proposal details, especially regarding how to 
allocate more funding to school districts with high poverty levels (Currie, Davis, Mayfield, 
McAsey, 2017). It isn’t entirely clear what Governor Rauner’s ideal solution would be. He has 
said with "the financial pressures that school districts are facing, the state is facing, the city of 
Chicago is facing, there's a lot of motivation to try to improve the system,” (Geiger, 2016) but 
Governor Rauner hasn’t yet offered any proposals for how to do that. Raising taxes and reducing 
state monies to wealthier districts to divert funds to poorer areas are proposals that have been 
floated by various reform advocates, but Governor Rauner has so far not endorsed this. Part of 
the reason for his hesitancy may be that the richer districts, which tend to be in the wealthier 
Chicago suburbs, would lose some funding. These districts are a part of his political base. He 
called the commission’s report a “roadmap” that could be used to draft legislation for education 
funding reform (Finke, 2017).  House Speaker Michael Madigan is pushing for a tax increase for 
millionaires to fund public education, but Governor Rauner has opposed this.   
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Another suggestion from Governor Rauner involves eliminating unfunded mandates in 
schools.  In a September 2015 letter to lawmakers, Governor Rauner said mandate relief would 
save school districts $200 million each year (Garcia, 2015). The state imposes around 100 
mandates on schools, and Governor Rauner is particularly focusing on eliminating outside 
contract restrictions for things like janitorial services and transportation, driver education classes, 
and physical education requirements. This proposal can be seen to be part of a national 
movement on the part of Republicans and conservatives to “privatize” more governmental 
functions and services. If a district can’t or doesn’t want to abide by a mandate, they can apply 
for a waiver, but this takes hearings and state approval. Illinois Association of School 
Administrators communications director Michael Chamness says the association supports 
eliminating unfunded mandates that don’t relate to public safety or civil rights. Chamness also 
says school boards should be able to decide the appropriate mandates for their own districts 
(Bock, 2015).  
The numbers show a clear disparity between wealthy and poor school districts in Illinois. 
Rich districts get more state money, and poor districts get less. Nearly 65 percent of school 
district funding comes from local sources, i.e. property taxes, instead of from the state. This 
makes Illinois a regressive funding state. In progressive states such as Connecticut, when 
reliance on property wealth creates a funding gap, the state closes the gap by supplying more 
money to high poverty districts to even things out. In Connecticut, this means the highest poverty 
school districts actually end up with about 5 percent more funding than low poverty districts 
(Ushomirsky, Williams, 2015, p. 6). Our system ultimately leads to Illinois having the worst 
funding gap in the country. Part of this can also be attributed to the flat income tax rate in 
Illinois, which, again, can be called regressive because it tends to affect the most those with the 
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lowest incomes. The other key player in this issue is the overreliance on property taxes, which 
will be discussed further in the next section. The School Funding Reform Commission’s 
suggestion of establishing “a unique funding target (“adequacy”) for each district that reflects the 
particular needs of children in that district and will lead to improved outcomes for students” 
sounds like it could be a step in the right direction, but it’s still vague and doesn’t give much 
indication of how it would work beyond giving additional resources to students from low-income 
families, English language learners and those with disabilities. Until a way to close the education 
funding gap is worked out and passed by lawmakers, Illinois students in districts with the fewest 
resources and highest poverty will continue to receive the short end of the stick.  
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Property Tax Freeze 
According to a 2015 Report from the Tax Foundation, Illinois has the second-highest 
property taxes in the country at a rate of 2.32 percent (Walczak, 2015).  
Figure 4 
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Figure 5 
 (2015 Tax Foundation property tax rates, Walczak, 2015) 
Governor Rauner argues that this drives businesses away to nearby states where they can pay 
less for their business properties (Rauner, 2014, p. 10-11).  
As a solution, Governor Rauner’s Turnaround Agenda states:  
“Starting in property tax year 2016, payable in 2017, all property tax extensions from 
local taxing districts will be equal to the extension from 2015. 
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This will impact home rule and non-home rule units of government and both PTELL and 
non-PTELL counties. 
It will still be possible for a property owner to see fluctuations in property tax bills due to 
an increase/decrease in value, new construction or the expiration of a tax increment 
financing district. 
Through a referendum, voters may decide to break through the property tax freeze” 
(Rauner, 2014, p. 11).  
The governor’s proposals have been met with criticisms due to the public school districts’ 
heavy reliance on property taxes for funding. According to the Illinois School Funding Reform 
Commission’s 2016 overview of education local, state and federal funding, in 2016 local sources 
accounted for 64.9 percent of funding for schools while state sources accounted for just 26.5 
percent. When the state’s contribution is so low, school districts are forced to raise their property 
tax levies or cut programs (Illinois State Board of Education, 2016, p. 2). Any freeze of property 
taxes would disrupt funding and cause schools to need to find other ways to fund their programs. 
Again, Governor Rauner would have lawmakers get rid of unfunded mandates imposed on 
school districts, thereby saving some money on staff and other resources.  
Senate President John Cullerton said in a 2015 statement:  
“Education funding in Illinois is inappropriately reliant upon property taxes. For that 
reason, I have been clear from the beginning of negotiations with the Governor on his tax 
freeze plans. There can be no property tax freeze without companion reforms to fix 
Illinois’ broken school funding formula. 
 Any effort to restrict property taxes without first finding ways to shift the education 
funding burden is an attack on schools and a cap on opportunity for kids across the state. 
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 For responsible property tax relief, we can work together to advance reforms that won’t 
saddle schoolchildren and middle class workers with the burden of paying the price" 
(Cullerton, 2015). 
Governor Rauner’s response to these arguments is as follows: “We're going to give more 
state support for education. That eases up on the property tax burden, No. 1, and No. 2: We're 
going to empower local voters to get control of their local government costs and shrink the 
bureaucracy of the local governments. That frees up money for education. So it's a two-pronged 
approach: more state support and more local voter control of their government cost” (Long, 
Eldeib, Geiger, 2015).  
In addition to getting rid of mandates, Governor Rauner is pushing for a consolidation of 
local government units, the largest number of which are school district and special districts. 
Local officials are concerned with this proposal because they say this consolidation would 
require combining entities to use the lowest tax rate of all the entities coming together and it 
would force joined townships, for example, to provide services to more people with less money. 
Getting rid of mandates such as restricting outsourcing of janitorial jobs is often seen as anti-
union and a step toward privatization. In February 2017, the Senate passed a government 
consolidation measure as a part of the “grand bargain” budget deal package, but in order for this 
to take effect, all bills in the package must pass (Lindstrom, 2017).  
Illinois ranks 15th in the nation in terms of financial aid to schools, according to the 2017 
Quality Counts report by Education Week Research Center (Lloyd, 2017). According to the 
latest data from the United States Census Bureau, in 2014 state funding for Illinois elementary 
and secondary public schools accounted for $11,163,462,000 of the $30,407,109,000 public 
elementary and secondary education budget, or 36.7 percent (United States Census Bureau, 
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2016, p. 1). The average expenditure per student in 2016 was  $12,007 (Corrections to Quality 
Counts 2016, 2016), but it is clear from the U.S. Census Data that the majority of this 
expenditure comes from non-state sources. 
As a point of comparison, it is helpful to study how surrounding states fund their school 
districts:  
Indiana:  
Indiana ranks 21st in the nation in terms of financial aid to schools, according to the 2017 
Quality Counts report by Education Week Research Center (Lloyd, 2017). According to 
the latest data from the United States Census Bureau, in 2014 state funding in Indiana 
accounted for $7,632,238,000 of the $12,149,675,000 public elementary and secondary 
education budget, or 62.8 percent (United States Census Bureau, 2016, p. 1). The average 
expenditure per student in 2016 was $11,093 (Corrections to Quality Counts 2016, 2016). 
State funding in Indiana is based on membership. Twice a year, schools send a headcount 
(their average daily membership, or ADM) to the state and they receive their foundation 
grant amount per student. In 2016, the foundation amount was $4,984 and for 2017 it is  
$5,105 per student (Morello, 2015). The state is currently trying to equalize the funding 
between the rich and poor school districts in the state, which is termed the “transition to 
foundation” (Morello, 2015). ADM is a narrower and more restrictive measure which 
often penalizes poor districts with more poor people who usually miss school more.  
Districts also receive aid based on their “at-risk” students, which are calculated using the 
“complexity index” (Morello, 2015). “At-risk” students used to be determined based on 
who received reduced-price and free lunch, but now the state distributes complexity 
money based on families who qualify for one of three federal low-income programs: 
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“foster care, the Supplemental Nutritional Assistance Program (food stamps) or 
Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF)” (McInerny, 2015).  
This could mean less state aid for children in a handful of the highest poverty districts 
where students qualify for reduced-price but not free lunch, but districts also receive 
more money if they have more disabled students, so that may help low-income districts 
because they tend to have more of these children (Elliot, 2015). English Language 
Learners are also part of the complexity index, and schools with large numbers of English 
Language Learners receive double the aid, in some cases. More funds are distributed 
based on the number of students who graduate with honors. This system is currently 
affecting urban area schools more so than rural school districts because urban Indiana 
schools are undergoing a decrease in enrollment, and foundation levels are based on 
student headcount (Morello, 2015).  
Michigan:  
Michigan ranks 34th in the nation in terms of financial aid to schools, according to the 
2017 Quality Counts report by Education Week Research Center (Lloyd, 2017). Local 
school districts are primarily financed through local taxation and state and federal 
funding. In 1994, the state raised a number of taxes and the revenue generated from those 
raises went to the State School Aid Fund (SAF). The sales tax went from 4 percent to 6 
percent and the 2 percent raise went to the SAF, the use tax increased by 2 percent, which 
went to SAF, and the cigarette tax went up from 25 cents to 75 cents per pack, with 63.4 
percent of that increase going to the SAF (Summers, 2015, p. 4). Local property taxes are 
capped at six mills of the value of a home (one mill is equal to 1/1000, so if the home was 
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worth $100,000, a homeowner would pay $600 in property taxes), 24 mills of non-
homestead properties (businesses, rentals, vacation homes, etc.) and 18 mills for schools 
(Summers, 2015, p. 9).  
According to the latest data from the United States Census Bureau, in 2014 state funding 
in Michigan accounted for $10,073,758,000 of the $17,529,062,000 public elementary 
and secondary education budget, or 57.5 percent (United States Census Bureau, 2016, p. 
1). The average expenditure per student in 2016 was  $$12,188 (Corrections to Quality 
Counts 2016, 2016). Voters approve assessed mills on non-homesteads in their school 
districts and school districts can also ask voters to approve levy mills for debts (example: 
money spent to buy, maintain, or upgrade capital assets like land, machinery or facilities), 
sinking funds (example: buying land for future construction projects) and to supplement 
operational funding (Summers, 2015, p. 10). School districts receive a foundation amount 
of funding based on the pupil-count. Each district must levy 18 mills on non-homestead 
properties and the revenues from these mills are calculated by the state on a per-pupil 
basis. The state then deducts the local revenue amount from the minimum foundation 
level amount, which is set at $4,200 per student (Summers, 2015, p. 13). 
Wisconsin:   
Wisconsin ranks 12th in the nation in terms of financial aid to schools according to the 
2017 Quality Counts report by Education Week Research Center (Lloyd, 2017). 
According to the latest data from the United States Census Bureau, in 2014 state funding 
accounted in Wisconsin for $5,709,579,000 of the $11,001,272,000 public elementary 
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and secondary education budget, or 51.9 percent (United States Census Bureau, 2016, p. 
1). The average expenditure per student in 2016 was  $12,031 (Corrections to Quality 
Counts 2016, 2016). Wisconsin uses a three-tiered formula to distribute state aid to public 
school districts. This involves three different equations that, when taken together, 
determine a district’s Equalization Aid (State of Wisconsin, 2016). The state and local 
district each take a percentage of the cost. The district’s portion is determined by the 
“percentage the district value per member is of the guaranteed valuation per member” 
(State of Wisconsin, 2016). Each district would take on the percentage of cost at that tier 
and the Equalization Aid would supply the difference. This method is used at all tiers, but 
each tier has different numbers. For a more detailed breakdown of the Wisconsin school 
funding formula, see Appendix B.  
Iowa: 
Iowa ranks 17th in the nation in terms of financial aid to schools according to the 
2017 Quality Counts report by Education Week Research Center (Lloyd, 2017). 
According to the latest data from the United States Census Bureau, in 2014 state 
funding in Iowa accounted for $3,247,115,000 of the $6,194,941,000 public 
elementary and secondary education budget, or 52.4 percent (United States 
Census Bureau, 2016, p. 1). The average expenditure per student in 2016 was  
$12,254 (Corrections to Quality Counts 2016, 2016). Until the 1970s, Iowa 
schools were funded similarly to Illinois — with an overreliance on property taxes 
(Snyder, 2013, p.1). In 1971, an enrollment-based model was put in place, which 
greatly increase state appropriations for school districts. State lawmakers 
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determine a Cost Per Pupil — in 2013, this was $6,001.  This serves as the 
minimum that all  
Figure 6 
school districts must have for all pupils. The Governor recommends an Allowable 
Growth Rate to lawmakers. In 2013, this rate was two percent. So to get 2014’s 
actual State Cost Per Pupil, the minimum amount is multiplied by the Allowable 
Growth Rate. In 2013, this would mean 6,001 was multiplied by .02, which 
amounts to $120. Thus, the minimum Cost Per Pupil for 2014 would be 6,001 
plus 120, arriving at $6,121 per pupil. The Cost Per Pupil increases yearly by this 
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system unless the allowable growth is set at zero. (Image below from Snyder, 
2013).  
Figure 7 
School district funding is primarily determined by this cost per pupil amount and 
the number of students in that district. The district cost-per-pupil is multiplied by 
its weighted enrollment to calculate their total allocation (Oakley, Snyder, 2013, 
p. 7). In 2008, a law was put in place to allow schools to use any money left over
from their state infrastructure allocation for property tax relief. Iowa allocates 
more state money to property-poor districts. (Above image from Oakley, Snyder, 
2013).  
51 
Missouri: 
Missouri ranks 31st in the nation in terms of financial aid to schools according to 
the 2017 Quality Counts report by Education Week Research Center (Lloyd, 
2017). According to the latest data from the United States Census Bureau, in 2014 
state funding in Missouri accounted for $4,267,069,000 of the $10,163,998,000 
public elementary and secondary education budget, or 41.9 percent (United States 
Census Bureau, 2016, p. 1). The average expenditure per student in 2016 was  
$10,928 (Corrections to Quality Counts 2016, 2016). Missouri schools are funded 
based on the following factors:  
1. Weighted average daily attendance: This is the number of students
who attend school daily, on average — districts can either choose
the current year’s average or either of the two previous year’s
(Riley, 2016). This number is weighted more if a district has an
above average number of students that would typically require
more resources, such as English language learners, special
education and low-income students.
2. State adequacy target: This target is supposed to ensure every
student’s learning needs are being met and that funding is equitable
between districts (Riley, 2016). This is set by the state based on
how much top-performing districts spend in operational funding.
3. Dollar value modifier: This uses factors like pay and purchasing
power to determine how much a district will need to pay
employees. Districts with a higher cost of living tend to receive
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more state funding than those with a lower cost of living (Riley, 
2016).  
4. Local effort: This number takes into account how much a district
would be able to come up with themselves to fund education. The
more revenue that can be generated through property taxes, the less
it would receive from the state. However, this amount is “frozen in
time” (Riley, 2016) based on a district’s 2005 property tax amount,
which is the year before this funding formula was put in place.
Kentucky 
Kentucky ranks 28th in the nation in terms of financial aid to schools according to 
the 2017 Quality Counts report by Education Week Research Center (Lloyd, 
2017). According to the latest data from the United States Census Bureau, in 2014 
state funding in Kentucky accounted for $3,966,872,000 of the $7,228,770,000 
public elementary and secondary education budget, or 54.9 percent (United States 
Census Bureau, 2016, p. 1). The average expenditure per student in 2016 was 
$10,562 (Corrections to Quality Counts 2016, 2016). The Kentucky General 
Assembly sets a per-pupil dollar amount for each budget cycle. The Guaranteed 
Base Funding multiples the per-pupil amount by the district’s average daily 
attendance (ADA), which is taken from the end-of-the year average and adjusted 
for growth by drawing a comparison between the current year’s first two-month 
ADA and the prior year’s first two-month ADA (Kentucky General Assembly, 
2015, p. 1). ADA is defined as “the aggregate days attended by pupils in a public 
school, adjusted for weather-related low attendance days if applicable, divided by 
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the actual number of days school is in session, after the five days with the lowest 
attendance have been deducted” (Kentucky General Assembly, 2015, p. 1).  
There are additional statutes that take into account the extra costs associated with 
at-risk and English-language learning students and grant additional funding onto 
the Guaranteed Base Funding. At-risk student funding is determined based on the 
number of students who receive free lunch through the National School Lunch 
Program. The average daily membership of students who receive free lunch is 
multiplied by 15 percent of the Guaranteed Base Per Pupil amount. Exceptional 
Child Funding is given based on the students with “low incidence disabilities, 
moderate incidence disabilities, and high incidence disabilities” (Kentucky 
General Assembly, 2015, p. 2), and these are weighted at 2.35, 1.17 and 0.24, 
respectively. The weighting is multiplied by the Guaranteed Base Per Pupil 
amount to determine the additional dollar amount. The number of students 
receiving English Language Learning instruction is weighted at 9.6 and multiplied 
by the Guaranteed Base Per Pupil amount to determine additional funding. Local 
Effort funding comes from revenues generated by property taxes within the 
district. Each district must have a tax rate of 30 cents for every $100 of assessed 
property and motor vehicle value. The Local Effort funding amount is subtracted 
by the Base Funding amount to come to the Calculated Funding Amount.  
The Adjusted SEEK (Support Education Excellence in Kentucky) Funding is the 
amount a district receives once the add-ons like at-risk, Exceptional Child and 
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English Language-Learning funding has been calculated. Districts can raise their 
Local Effort levy up to 15 percent of the Adjusted SEEK Funding level. The 
General Assembly sets an equalization level during each budget session that gives 
more funding to districts with lower property wealth than those with higher 
property wealth.  
In 1990, poorer school districts in Kentucky sued the state, saying the previous 
funding formula disadvantaged their schools. The courts found in their favor, 
saying lawmakers had to find a way to reduce the gap between funding for rich 
schools and funding for poor schools. This led to their current system, and within 
five years improved the testing scores, graduation rates and literacy levels in the 
state’s public schools. However, this discrepancy still remains due to the property 
tax provision in the funding formula. A poor district like Wolfe County in 
Kentucky only receives an additional $20 per student after a 4 percent property 
tax increase while a 4 percent increase in the wealthiest district in the state adds 
an additional $450 per student (Sanchez, 2016). 
It is clear that Illinois contributes the smallest percent amount of state money to school 
districts out of any surrounding states. As mentioned in the ‘Education Reform’ section of this 
report, the 2015 Funding Gap report from the Education Trust stated that the largest gap between 
rich and poor districts of any state in the country is in Illinois. Low poverty districts receive 19 
percent more funding than high poverty districts. In Indiana, high poverty districts receive 12 
percent more than low poverty districts, and in Michigan, low poverty districts receive 6 percent 
less. High poverty districts in Wisconsin get 6 percent more than low poverty districts and in 
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Iowa, low poverty districts receive 4 percent less. Poor Missouri school districts are allocated 4 
percent less than wealthy ones and in Kentucky, poor districts get 11 percent more than their rich 
counterparts (Ushomirsky, Williams, 2015, p. 4). 
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Figure 8 
As the chart shows, in Illinois, poorer districts receive 19 percent less funding than wealthy 
districts. In Indiana, poorer districts receive 12 percent more than wealthy districts (Ushomirsky, 
Williams, 2015, p. 4). Much of this discrepancy is due to the reliance on property taxes to fund 
Illinois schools, which means that districts with less property wealth have less for their schools 
than districts with high property wealth. Part of this could also be attributed to the use of average 
daily attendance, rather than enrollment, in determining part of general state aid funding in 
Illinois. Studies show that children from low income backgrounds are almost twice as likely to 
miss class than their wealthier peers (Nelson, 2014). The above chart and below table show that 
states that use enrollment, rather than attendance, to determine part of state aid are more likely to 
have more equitable funding between their poor and rich school districts.  
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Chart 7 
State 
Average Per 
Student 
Expenditure 
State Ranking — 
financial aid to 
schools 
(Education 
Week Research 
Center Report) 
Use of Average 
Daily 
Attendance vs. 
Enrollment for 
Foundation 
Funding Level 
Overall Percent 
of Total 2014 
Public Education 
Funding 
Provided by the 
State (U.S. 
Census Bureau) 
Illinois $12,007 15th Average daily 
attendance  
36.7 percent 
Indiana $11,093 21st Enrollment 
(taken twice a 
year) 
62.8 percent 
Michigan $12,188 34th Enrollment 57.5 percent 
Wisconsin $12,031 12th Enrollment 51.9 percent 
Iowa $12,254 17th Enrollment 52.4 percent 
Missouri $10,928 31st Average daily 
attendance (can 
choose any of 
the last three 
years) 
41.9 percent 
Kentucky $10,562 28th Average daily 
attendance 
54.9 percent 
In order for a property tax freeze to not wreak havoc on Illinois schools, Governor 
Rauner and lawmakers would have to follow through on education funding reform and allocate 
more state money to school districts, especially the less wealthy districts. As discussed in the 
previous “Education Reform” section, any attempt to diminish property tax revenue would 
impact the source of 65 percent of school district funding, and ultimately would create a larger 
burden on low-income districts. Governor Rauner says a property tax freeze must be included in 
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any budget bill before he’ll sign it, it is clear that a higher priority should be changing the way 
Illinois school districts are funded.  
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Pension Reform 
The state’s unfunded pension liabilities have now reached a record $130 billion 
(McKinney, 2016). The Illinois State Constitution reads: “Membership in any pension or 
retirement system of the State, any unit of local government or school district, or any agency or 
instrumentality thereof, shall be an enforceable contractual relationship, the benefits of which 
shall not be diminished or impaired” (Ill. Const. art. XIII, § 5).  
It was because of this that in May 2015, the Illinois Supreme Court declared 
unconstitutional a pension law that was aimed to scale back state worker benefits to try to 
alleviate the then-$105 billion pension debt (Pearson, Geiger, 2015). This pension reform law, 
which was signed by Gov. Pat Quinn in 2013, stopped automatic yearly cost-of-living increases 
for retired state employees, changed the retirement age later for workers under 45 years of age 
from 60 to 67 years old and put a limit on the salary amounts used to determine pension benefits. 
Essentially, it created a two-tier pension system in which employees hired after January 1, 2011 
have scaled-back benefits, because the Supreme Court’s decision prohibited any decrease in 
benefits to state workers that were already employed and had contractually secured pensions.  
The state tried to appeal on the basis that the fiscal crisis in the state justified the law 
changes, but Republican Justice Lloyd Karmeier, stated on behalf of all seven justices:  
“Our economy is and has always been subject to fluctuations, sometimes very extreme 
fluctuations. The law was clear that the promised benefits would therefore have to be 
paid and that the responsibility for providing the state's share of the necessary funding 
fell squarely on the legislature's shoulders. 
The General Assembly may find itself in crisis, but it is a crisis which other public 
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pension systems managed to avoid and ... it is a crisis for which the General Assembly 
itself is largely responsible. 
It is our obligation, however, just as it is theirs, to ensure that the law is followed. That is 
true at all times. It is especially important in times of crisis when, as this case 
demonstrates, even clear principles and long-standing precedent are threatened. Crisis is 
not an excuse to abandon the rule of law. It is a summons to defend it” (Pearson, Geiger, 
2015).  
Governor Rauner has now proposed a different law, because the Illinois Pension Code 
states all pension agreements through 2014 must be 90 percent funded by 2045: 
“For State fiscal years 2012 through 2014, the minimum contribution to the System to be made 
by the State for each fiscal year shall be an amount determined by the System to be sufficient to 
bring the total assets of the System up to 90 percent of the total actuarial liabilities of the System 
by the end of State fiscal year 2045” (Illinois Pension Code, § 108-2-124). 
 Figure 9 
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(History of unfunded pension liabilities in Illinois, Illinois Commission on Government 
Forecasting and Accountability, 2015, p. 34).  
This is an issue Illinois has been struggling with for decades. The state has shorted 
pension payments to provide budgetary relief for quite some time. From 1985 to 2012, the state 
underpaid pension funds by $41.2 billion dollars, the Commission on Government Forecasting 
and Accountability calculated in 2013 (McKinney, 2015). In 1989, Public Act 86-1273, which 
took effect on August 23, 1989, enacted a 3 percent annual cost of living increase for retirees in 
all 5 of the state pension plans, which only led to the unfunded liability getting larger and larger.  
In 1994, Republican Gov. Jim Edgar created what is known as the “Edgar ramp” with the goal of 
stabilizing the state retirement system within 50 years. Edgar’s aim was to have the pension 
funds 90 percent funded by 2045. Under this plan, payments from the state to pension funds 
would be low for 15 years before ramping upward as years passed. The modest initial payments 
did little to alleviate the accumulated pension debt, and shifted “costs to the future and, as a 
result, created significant financial stress and risks for the state,” as the Securities and Exchange 
Commission reported in 2013 (United States Securities and Exchange Commission, 2013, section 7).  
Figure 10 
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(Chart above from McKinney, 2015).  
Many blame the Edgar ramp for the majority of the unfunded pension liability crisis but Edgar 
blames later lawmakers for not adjusting the ramp for pension enhancements, the 3 percent cost 
of living increase act and the skipped pension payments from 2006-7 under Gov. Rod 
Blagojevich (McKinney, 2015).  
Public Act 90-0582, passed in 1998, implemented a benefit increase for retirees in the 
Teachers’ Retirement System, allowing them to earn creditable service at a rate of 2.2 percent of 
their final average salary for each year of service (Illinois General Assembly, 1998). In 2001, 
Public Act 92-0014 was passed. This Act increased the maximum retirement annuity for 
alternative formula employees to 80 percent of their final average salary (Illinois General 
Assembly, 2001). In 2002, Public Act 92-0566 was passed, which created an early retirement 
incentive for members of the Teachers Retirement System and the State Employees Retirement 
System by letting them buy up to 5 years of service credit and age enhancement (Illinois General 
Assembly, 2002). They were then required to retire between July 1, 2002 and December 31, 
2002. About 11,000 workers took advantage of this and many were eligible to receive benefits 
immediately, increasing the pension liabilities by $2.3 billion (McKinney, 2015).  
In another bill passed in 2003, the Legislature approved Gov. Rod Blagojevich's plan to 
borrow $10 billion, and of that, $7.3 billion went toward payment of pension liabilities. In 2005, 
a bill introduced before the Illinois General Assembly was aimed at stopping pension abuses 
such as artificially raising end-of-career salaries so pension payments would be more for retirees, 
as some school districts had been doing. This bill also included a provision to allow the state to 
skip $2 billion in pension payments to try to close a gap in the state’s budget. Its supporters said 
it would save the state $35 billion through 2005, so the skipped payments would not be a 
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problem to make up (McKinney, 2015). This is called a “pension holiday” and has been a 
frequent practice in Illinois.  
The 2008 stock market crash resulted in huge investment losses for the five state pension 
systems and added another $9.3 billion to the pension debt (McKinney, 2015). The next major 
pension movement in the state was the aforementioned 2013 bill from Gov. Pat Quinn that 
attempted to halt the compounded annual cost-of-living increases. The Supreme Court ruling in 
May 2015 established those increases can never be taken back, and the state is obligated to pay 
what it promised workers they would receive. These provisions all taken together created and 
exacerbated the state pension problem. From 1995 to 2005, the state’s accumulated pension debt 
went from $19.5 billion to $38.6 billion, a 97 percent increase (Commission on Government 
Forecasting and Accountability, 2006, p. 4).  
There are five major state-run pension systems; these are the State Employees Retirement 
System (SERS), the State Universities Retirement System (SURS), the Teachers’ Retirement 
System (TRS), the Judges’ Retirement System (JRS) and the General Assembly Retirement 
System (GARS).  
Governor Rauner’s Turnaround Agenda proposes the following reform to the state pension plans 
SERS, SURS, TRS and GARS:  
Tier 1 pension members’ service was frozen from July 1, 2015 and all new employees 
were hired under a Tier 2 service. Under Tier 2, retirement age is 67 years old after 10 
years of service and an annuity is based on the highest eight of the last 10 years of 
service. The yearly Final Average Salary cannot be more than $111,600 as “automatically 
increased by the lesser of 3 percent or one-half of the annual increase in the [consumer 
price index] during the preceding year” (Rauner, 2014, p.23).  
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Cost of living adjustments are equal to whichever is smaller, 3 percent or half of the 
yearly increase in the consumer price index. They are not compounded. Overtime is not 
pensionable salary and for TRS and SURS, the 6 percent limit on their final average salary 
increase will be tied to the annual spike in the consumer price index. There is also the choice of a 
pension “buyout”, not unlike the way many 401k retirement plans work in the private sector. 
This would be a partial pension buyout for Tier 1 members — if they choose to take a reduction 
to the existing Tier 1 cost of living adjustment, they could get a lump sum amount of money and 
move to a defined contribution plan as opposed to a defined benefit plan. The lump sum would 
move into a new account and be the starting balance for the 401k-style account. In this, both 
employees and their employers (in this case, the state of Illinois) make payments to the account. 
Instead of pensions being 90 percent funded by 2045, Governor Rauner proposed that 
they be 100 percent funded and “contribution increases caused by investment return assumption 
changes will be smoothed over a five-year period” (Rauner, 2014, p. 23). As the upcoming chart 
from Braun shows, in 2015, Wisconsin and South Dakota pensions were 100 percent funded and 
North Carolina, Oregon, Tennessee and Idaho were at 90 percent funded (Braun, 2015).  
In the Turnaround, the governor outlines the following savings if the four pension 
systems undergo these reforms:  
“FY16 reduction of $2.2 billion in contribution, lowering the GRF contribution 
from $6.6 billion to $4.4 billion. 
Over $100 billion in total state contribution savings from FY16 – FY45. 
Immediate unfunded liability reduction of $25 billion” (Rauner, 2014, p. 23).  
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In addition to these immediate reforms, Governor Rauner also wants a constitutional 
amendment added that would change pensions from being a contractual right for newly 
hired state employees. In the Turnaround Agenda, he states:  
“The Illinois Constitution details that pension system membership is a contractual 
right. While it is the position of the Governor’s Office that such protection only 
applies to currently earned benefits, the Illinois Constitution should be amended 
to explicitly apply only to historically-earned benefits, not to benefits that may be 
accrued through future work” (Rauner, 2014, p. 24).  
Teachers, university workers, lawmakers and downstate police and firefighters are 
lumped into one proposal where they can choose to continue receiving the three percent 
compounded cost-of-living adjustment annually to their pensions but no longer have future wage 
increases count in determining benefits. Otherwise, they could take smaller annual increases and 
have future raises still count toward benefits. These increases would go off the Tier-2 plan which 
was put in place for state employees hired after January 1, 2011 (Finke, 2015).  
Some in the Illinois Senate have their own, albeit very similar, pension proposal.  The 
latest plan being pushed by Senate President John Cullerton would change benefits for Tier-1 
plan members but would give them a choice. Cullerton's proposal, which would not apply to the 
judge or state employee retirement systems, center around the 3 percent compounded annual 
cost-of-living increases Tier-1 members are granted. It would give Tier-1 workers two choices: 
either continue receiving the cost-of-living increases but have the salary the increases are 
calculated on frozen, or take an annual increase amounting to either 3 percent or half the 
inflation rate, whichever is less, and the annual raises would not be compounded. With the 
second option, a worker wouldn’t be able to collect on their annual increases until reaching the 
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age of 65 but they would get a 10 percent decrease in the amount they are obliged to contribute 
to their pensions and a 10 percent lump sum of what the employee has contributed to their 
pension so far (Finke, 2017). Some unions say this is unconstitutional because it would infringe 
on benefits already promised to retirees, but Cullerton says since it is voluntary, it is 
constitutional. The Senate President’s office estimates his proposal saving Illinois $700 million 
to $1 billion annually. 
This plan was part of the “grand bargain” budget deal being advanced jointly by 
Cullerton and Senate Minority Leader Christine Radogno. The deal includes a minimum wage 
and personal income tax hike as well as proposals for a property tax freeze and workers’ 
compensation reform, two must-have pieces of legislation for Gov. Governor Rauner. In his 
annual budget address before the Illinois General Assembly on February 15, 2017, Governor 
Rauner said he wants Cullerton’s proposal to apply to all state pension plans, as it currently 
leaves out the State Employees Retirement System which also involves American Federation of 
State, County and Municipal Employees, with whom the governor is in a contractual impasse 
(Finke, 2017). When senators voted on the pension reform component of the package on 
February 8, 2017, it failed 18-29, with 10 voting “present.” It had no Republican support, and 
Radogno called it a “breach” of her agreement with Cullerton and said they had agreed not to 
call any votes until the bill’s language was clearer (Sfondeles, 2017). Though the grand bargain 
plan may still be on track, Cullerton’s pension reform plans have hit a roadblock. The following 
tables and charts outline the money received by retirees under state plans, the amount the state 
and recipients contribute to their respective plans and a comparison of Illinois pension liabilities 
with its surrounding states: 
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Chart 8 
Average Benefits by Retirement System FY16 
Average monthly 
retirement benefits 
Average monthly 
disability benefits 
Average monthly 
survivor benefits 
Number of benefit 
recipients 
Teachers’ Retirement 
System1 $4,521 $2,308 $1,944 117,650 
State Employees’ 
Retirement System2 $3,225 $2,468 $971 70,031 
State University 
Retirement System3 $2,397 $1,888 $1,628 63,146 
Judges’ Retirement 
System4 $11,333 0 $6,004 1,144 
General Assembly 
Retirement System5 $5,009 0 $2708 415 
1 Teachers' Retirement System Comprehensive Annual Financial Report for the Fiscal Year Ended June 
30, 2016 
2 State Employees' Retirement System of Illinois Comprehensive Annual Financial Report for the Fiscal 
Year Ended June 30, 2016 
3 State Universities’ Retirement System Comprehensive Annual Financial Report for Fiscal Year Ended 
June 30, 2016 
4 Judges’ Retirement System Comprehensive Annual Financial Report For the Fiscal Year Ended June 
30, 2016 
5 General Assembly Retirement System Comprehensive Annual Financial Report For the Fiscal 
Year Ended June 30, 2016 
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Figure 11 
(Figure above from Braun, 2015). 
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As a point of comparison, the following are the pension liabilities of surrounding states 
compared to that of Illinois:  
1. Illinois — 47.1 percent funded, ranked 50/50
2. Indiana — 63.1 percent funded, ranked 35/50
3. Michigan — 61.6 percent funded, ranked 39/50
4. Wisconsin — 99.9 percent funded, ranked 2/50
5. Iowa — 82.3 percent funded, ranked 13/50
6. Missouri — 73.3 percent funded, ranked 22/50
7. Kentucky — 48.9 percent funded, ranked 49/50
a. Notably, neighboring Kentucky is the next-lowest funded pension system
in the country.
Data based on a “Fitch Ratings analysis of Bureau of Economic Analysis data 
(personal income per capita); and National Association of State Retirement 
Administrators analysis of most recent state data from 2014 or 2013 (funded pension 
obligations)” (Kuriloff, Martin, 2015).  
Since the teacher retirement system is often a state’s largest sponsored pension 
system, the following is a comparison of the teacher retirement systems of Illinois and 
those surrounding states that keep separate data for teacher pension funds:  
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Chart 9 
State 
FY2016 Average monthly 
teacher retirement benefits 
Number of retirement 
benefit recipients 
Illinois6 $4,521 105,937 
Indiana7 $1,433 57,552 
Michigan8 $1,834 187,546 
Kentucky9 $3,114 47,121 
Figure 12 
6 Teachers' Retirement System Comprehensive Annual Financial Report for the Fiscal Year 
Ended June 30, 2016 
7 Indiana Public Retirement System Comprehensive Annual Financial Report for the Fiscal Year 
Ended June 30, 2016 
8 Michigan Public School Employees' Retirement System Comprehensive Annual Financial 
Report for the Fiscal Year Ended September 30, 2016  
9 Teachers' Retirement System of the State of Kentucky Comprehensive Annual Financial Report 
for the Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 2016  
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The following charts provide a more detailed comparison of Illinois and surrounding state 
pension systems (all data from United States Census Bureau 2015 Annual Survey of Public Pensions):  
Chart 10 
State Systems Total Members Active Members Inactive Members 
State Local Members 
Percent of 
total Members 
Percent of 
total 
Illinois 6 654 966,921 601,394 
62.20 
percent 365,527 
37.80 
percent 
Indiana 8 239 277,160 226,713 
81.80 
percent 50,447 
18.20 
percent 
Michigan 6 142 331,843 295,764 
89.13 
percent 36,079 
10.87 
percent 
Wisconsin 1 3 439,006 273,091 
62.21 
percent 165,915 
37.79 
percent 
Iowa 4 8 240,135 172,307 
71.75 
percent 67,828 
28.25 
percent 
Missouri 12 78 388,454 288,204 
74.19 
percent 100,250 
25.81 
percent 
Kentucky 6 28 365,261 218,259 
59.75 
percent 147,002 
40.25 
percent 
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Figure 1310 
10 An active member is one who is still making contributions and accumulating assets. An 
inactive member is one who no longer makes contributions to their pension but has not yet 
started to receive their retirement benefits.  
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Chart 11 
State 
Total employer 
and employee 
contributions 
Employee 
Contributions 
Government 
Contributions 
Earnings on 
investments 
Contributions 
Percent 
of total Contributions 
Percent 
of total 
Illinois $12,744,871 $2,738,744 
21.49 
percent $10,006,127 
78.51 
percent $8,117,747 
Indiana $2,228,342 $350,551 
15.73 
percent $1,877,791 
84.27 
percent $1,687,968 
Michigan $4,787,637 $661,508 
13.82 
percent $4,126,129 
86.18 
percent $3,440,909 
Wisconsin $2,089,569 $963,512 
46.11 
percent $1,126,057 
53.89 
percent $5,816,893 
Iowa $1,257,655 $491,077 
39.05 
percent $766,578 
60.95 
percent $1,309,527 
Missouri $3,049,574 $966,078 
31.68 
percent $2,083,496 
68.32 
percent $4,090,531 
Kentucky $1,957,416 $600,283 
30.67 
percent $1,357,133 
69.33 
percent $1,728,922 
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Figure 14 
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Chart 12 
State 
Total 
Payments Benefits Withdrawals Other 
Illinois $17,557,862 $16,540,643 $329,865 $687,353 
Indiana $2,891,115 $2,467,535 $185,424 $238,162 
Michigan $8,776,832 $8,111,731 $209,493 $455,611 
Wisconsin $5,474,485 $5,025,773 $42,118 $406,593 
Iowa $2,069,216 $1,927,608 $48,238 $93,372 
Missouri $5,336,873 $4,585,567 $113,833 $637,474 
Kentucky $3,869,169 $3,666,352 $52,280 $150,537 
Figure 15 
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Illinois, ranked dead last in terms of unfunded pension liabilities in the country, is 
clearly in desperate need of reform when compared to surrounding states like Wisconsin 
(ranked 2nd), Iowa (ranked 13th) and Missouri (ranked 22nd). Illinois also has more 
members in its state-sponsored pension systems, with 966,921 compared to Wisconsin’s 
439,006, Iowa’s 240,135 and Missouri’s 388,454. This means the government contributes 
more in total outlays to pension systems, $10,006,127,000 to Wisconsin’s 
$1,126,057,000,  Iowa’s $766,578,000 and Missouri’s $2,083,496,000 annually. For 
years the state has shorted pension payments to provide budgetary relief (McKinney, 
2015). Had the government been making proper contributions all along, instead of the 
frequent practice of taking pension holidays, the unfunded liabilities might not have 
grown so large. Governors and legislators from both parties had to participate in this 
deficit spending practice over a long period of Illinois history to produce this level of 
pension debt.  
The Supreme Court has ruled that the benefits already promised cannot be 
infringed on. When adjusting for inflation, liabilities increased by 450 percent from 1999 
to 2013 (Furchtgott-Roth, 2016) and with a record $130 billion in unfunded pensions, it 
seems that the standard proposal of increasing taxes and cutting spending cannot be relied 
upon to fix the problem. The remaining answer, short of repealing the constitutional 
amendment requiring pension obligations to be met annually, would be to fundamentally 
change the obligations for new workers. Cullerton’s consideration model or Governor 
Rauner’s 401k proposals, though not as secure for employees as the previous model for 
government pensions, seem to be the next best method for digging the state out of its 
pension hole.  
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Redistricting Reform 
Governor Rauner also wants to reform how the state does redistricting. As it stands, 
congressional and state legislative district lines are drawn by the state legislature and subject to 
the governor’s veto. If the legislature fails to agree on a new map, responsibility falls to an eight-
member backup commission as provided for in the 1970 Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. art. IV, 
§ 3). Each minority and majority leader for each chamber selects two members, one legislator
and one member of the public. If a majority of this commission cannot agree to a plan, the 
Supreme Court submits one person from each political party to the Secretary of State, who then 
randomly selects one to break the tie (Levitt, 2016). Illinois is the only state with this default to a 
random draw plan for settling a redistricting impasse.  
Lines are drawn based on population data from a federal census taken every 10 years. A 
2011 bill requires legislative redistricting committees to hold at least one public hearing in one of 
four geographic districts in the state to receive input (Illinois General Assembly, 2011). Federal 
law requires districts to have equal population and not affect the voting power of racial or ethnic 
minority groups and the Illinois Voting Rights Act states that the Legislature, where legally 
possible, should draw districts in ways that allow minorities to sway elections to their choice of 
candidate, even if the federal Voting Rights Act did not require it (Levitt, 2016). State legislative 
districts must be “contiguous [meaning physically adjacent] and substantially equal in 
population” (Ill. Const. art. IV, § 3).  
Critics of this system maintain that it allows politicians to create districts in a way that 
gets them elected by favoring one political party over another. The current districts were drawn 
by Democrats and approved by Democratic Gov. Pat Quinn in 2011 and has given Democrats 
supermajorities in the legislature. The Illinois Republican Party in September 2016 issued a 
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statement saying “Pat Quinn is the very reason Illinois doesn't already have fair maps. In 2011, 
Quinn signed into law the gerrymandered district lines we have today. Instead of standing up for 
reform when he was in charge of the state, Quinn worked with Mike Madigan to rig the political 
system in their favor” (Miller, 2016).  
The 100th Illinois General Assembly, which took office on January 9, 2017, has a House 
of Representatives made of 67 Democrats and 51 Republicans. The Senate has 37 Democrats to 
22 Republicans. This is a net gain of 4 and 2 seats for Republicans respectively in the 2016 
elections. Democrats had the majority in 1992 in the Senate. Republicans held the majority in the 
Senate from 1993-2002 before Democrats retook control and have held a strong majority since. 
From 1992-2016 the Democrats only lost the majority to Republicans in the House for two years, 
in 1995 and 1996 (Illinois General Assembly, 2014). Illinois had Republican governors from 
1992-2002, so during these years it was considered a ‘divided government’, since Democrats had 
control of the two chambers (again, except for 1995 and 1996 when Republicans controlled both 
the House and Senate). From 2003-2013, the governor and both chambers were Democratic, 
making it a ‘unified Democratic government’. With Governor Rauner in office as governor and a 
Democratic control of the General Assembly, the government is divided once more, meaning the 
last three years would be light blue rather than dark blue on the following timeline, which 
illustrates the history of partisanship in Illinois state government (image via Ballotpedia, “Illinois 
General Assembly”, 2014):  
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Figure 16 
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Map 1 
This is the most recent Illinois legislative district map11: 
11 Illinois Legislative Districts. (2012). Retrieved February 21, 2017, from 
http://illinoisissues.uis.edu/archives/2012/02/redistrictmaps.html  
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Map 2 
For a more detailed breakdown of Cook and collar county districts12: 
12 Illinois Legislative Districts. (2012). Retrieved February 21, 2017, from 
http://illinoisissues.uis.edu/archives/2012/02/redistrictmaps.html  
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In April 2016, Governor Rauner endorsed the Independent Map Amendment coalition 
(Pearson, Geiger, 2016), which was a petition campaign that would put a measure before voters 
to decide whether or not to add an amendment to the state constitution to change the way 
legislative maps are drawn. If passed, this would form an independent commission made up of 
11 people who would bring a plan to the Secretary of State every redistricting year by June 30 
for legislative and representative districts.  
The districts would be equal in population and meet the following criteria: 
1. “The redistricting plan shall not dilute or diminish the ability of a racial or
language minority community to elect the candidates of its choice, including
when voting in concert with other persons
2. The redistricting plan shall respect the geographic integrity of units of local
government
3. The redistricting plan shall respect the geographic integrity of communities
sharing common social and economic interests, which do not include relationships
with political parties or candidates for office. The redistricting plan shall not
either intentionally or unduly discriminate against or intentionally or unduly favor
any political party, political group or particular person. In designing the
redistricting plan, the Commission shall consider party registration and voting
history data only to assess compliance with the requirements in this subsection
(a)” (Illinois Independent Redistricting Amendment, 2016)
Commissioners would be chosen by a 3-member Applicant Review Panel. Panel 
members are chosen by the Auditor General by March 1 on the years the federal decennial 
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census occurs. The Auditor General selects 30 applications from the pool of those submitted on 
the basis that the applicant is “a resident and registered voter of the State and has been for the 
four years preceding his or her application, has demonstrated understanding of and adherence to 
standards of ethical conduct and has been unaffiliated with any political party for the three years 
preceding appointment.” By March 31 of the same year, the Auditor General would publicly, 
randomly select the 3-member panel from the pool of 30.  
By May 31, the Panel selects 100 potential commissioners from the pool of applicants 
who are “diverse and unaffected by conflicts of interest by considering whether each applicant is 
a resident and registered voter of the State and has been for the four years preceding his or her 
application, as well as each applicant’s prior political experience, relevant analytical skills, 
ability to contribute to a fair redistricting process and ability to represent the demographic and 
geographic diversity of the State.” All records of this selection process would be available to the 
public except for private information about applicants.  
By no later than June 23, the Speaker and Minority Leader in the state House of 
Representatives and the President and Minority Leader in the Senate may remove as many as 
five potential commissioners. By no later than June 30, the panel would then publicly, randomly 
select 7 of the remaining commissioner pool who shall meet the following requirements:  
1. “The seven Commissioners shall reside among the Judicial Districts in the same
proportion as the number of Judges elected therefrom under Section 3 of Article
VI of this Constitution
2. Two Commissioners shall be affiliated with the political party whose candidate
for Governor received the most votes cast in the last general election for
Governor, two Commissioners shall be affiliated with the political party whose
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candidate for Governor received the second-most votes cast in such election and 
the remaining three Commissioners shall not be affiliated with either such 
political party 
3. No more than two Commissioners may be affiliated with the same political party.
The Speaker and Minority Leader of the House of Representatives and the President and 
Minority Leader of the Senate would then each pick one Commissioner from the remaining 
applicants on the basis of the “appointee’s contribution to the demographic and geographic 
diversity of the Commission” (Illinois Independent Redistricting Amendment, 2016).  
Once empowered, the Commission would act in public meetings to draw district lines, 
with the final plan requiring approval from: 
1. “Seven Commissioners total
2. Two Commissioners from each political party whose candidate for Governor
received the most and second most votes cast in the last general election for
Governor
3. Two Commissioners not affiliated with either such political party” (Illinois
Independent Redistricting Amendment, 2016).
All Commission meetings would need to be attended by a 6-Commissioner quorum and be given 
two-days public notice. In July 2016, a Cook County judge tossed the amendment from the 
ballot, saying it wasn’t within the state law’s time requirement for a petition-based amendment to 
the constitution to appear on the ballot in November 2016. This is the second second setback of 
this nature faced by the coalition in three years (Geiger, 2016). House Speaker Michael Madigan 
opposed the amendment, saying it would put protections ensuring minority representation in 
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jeopardy. Later, the State Supreme Court ruled that the plan was unconstitutional because it 
expanded the power of the State Auditor.   
As a point of comparison, these are the surrounding states’ redistricting procedures: 
Indiana 
1. State legislative lines and congressional lines are drawn by state legislators and
subject to governor veto
2. If the state legislature does not come up with a plan, a backup commission takes
the responsibility. This commission is made of 5 members — each legislative
chamber’s majority leader, the chair of each chamber’s redistricting committee
and a legislator chosen by the governor
3. Districts must comply with federal law which says each district must have about
an equal population and the Voting Rights Act, which says districts cannot
discriminate against minority populations.
4. Public hearing schedules are put together by the Senate majority leader to receive
public input into district lines (Levitt, 2016).
5. This process is currently undergoing a two-year review by a 12-member
legislative committee because critics say the small number of regulations allows
political parties, specifically the Republican party, to draw lines to advantage their
party in elections. When lines were drawn in 2011, the Republican majority
Legislature created districts in a way that allowed them to increase their 60-
member majority to a 69-member supermajority in the 2012 election cycle. Many
are advocating for Indiana to adopt a non-partisan committee system to draw its
lines (Carden, 2015).
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Michigan 
1. State legislative lines and congressional lines are drawn by state legislators and
subject to governor veto
2. The State Supreme Court has sole authority to hear any challenges to either state
or congressional districts
3. Public hearings are scheduled from both legislative houses for the public to give
input to districts
4. Districts must comply with federal law, which says each district must have about
an equal population and the Voting Rights Act, which says districts cannot
discriminate against minority populations
5. Districts must be contiguous and separate as few counties, town and city
boundaries as possible
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Wisconsin 
1. State legislative lines and congressional lines are drawn by state legislators and
subject to governor veto.
2. State legislative lines must be drawn in the first legislative session after every
Census. This is not required for congressional lines.
3. Each State Senate district must be made up of three State House districts
4. Districts must comply with federal law, which says each district must have about
an equal population and the Voting Rights Act, which says districts cannot
discriminate against minority populations.
5. Wisconsin law also says districts must be as compact as possible and not cut off
county, town or precinct lines where possible (Levitt, 2016).
6. In the event of a legislative impasse, federal courts are responsible for imposing a
redistricting plan. This has happened during three of the last four redistricting
cycles (Keane, 2016, p. 19).
7. In 2016, a panel of three federal judges ruled that the 2011 map drawn by the
Legislature was unconstitutional because it was gerrymandered to favor
Republicans (Wines, 2016) and lawmakers were ordered to draw new maps by
November 2017.  Republicans are now working to get this ruling overturned
(Marley, 2017).
88 
Iowa 
1. Iowa is usually considered the model for how to do redistricting in a non-partisan
manner directed by neutral technocrats. It is often pointed to by reformers in
Illinois and other states for the reforms they advocate.
2. State legislative lines and congressional lines are voted on by state legislators and
subject to governor veto
3. During this process, lawmakers receive draft district maps from a nonpartisan
advisory body and a bipartisan advisory commission. The body is called the
Legislative Services Agency (LSA). It makes potential district plans under Iowa’s
redistricting statute criteria and, if the criteria seem open to interpretation, the
LSA goes to the advisory commission.
4. Each legislative house minority and majority leader chooses one commissioner
and the four selected commissioners agree on a fifth. No commissioner is allowed
to hold elected office or partisan public office and must not be related to or
employed by a federal or state lawmaker
5. The LSA and the commission work together to make a redistricting plan for state
and congressional districts
6. An initial plan is presented to the legislature, and if it is rejected the LSA prepares
another based on legislator input. If rejected twice, the LSA presents one final
draft, which the legislature can modify at will. However, since this process
became law in 1980, the Iowa legislature has always approved an LSA proposed
plan.
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7. The state Supreme Court has jurisdiction to hear challenges regarding the drawn
districts
8. After the first LSA draft is submitted, a public copy is released and the advisory
commission is obliged to hold at least three public hearings in different areas of
the state. Feedback from these hearings is given to state lawmakers.
9. Districts must comply with federal law, which says each district must have about
an equal population and the Voting Rights Act, which says districts cannot
discriminate against minority populations
10. Where possible, State House districts should be contained within State Senate
districts, and both should be contained within congressional districts (Levitt,
2016).
Missouri 
1. State legislative lines and congressional lines are drawn by state legislators and
subject to governor veto
2. Two separate political commissions draw the lines. In the House, each major
party’s congressional district committee select two members for each
congressional district (which must not share the same state legislative district) and
the governor selects one per district per party. In the Senate, each major party’s
state party committee selects 10 members and the governor selects 5 per party
from that pool. Lobbyists cannot serve on either commission, and a plan must
have support from 70 percent of commissioners to pass.
3. If no plan is put forth from commissioners, the State Supreme Court has the
authority to choose six state appellate judges to draw the lines
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4. At least three public input hearings must be held, and at least one of these must be
after the commission submits their first plan draft
5. Districts must comply with federal law, which says each district must have about
an equal population and the Voting Rights Act, which says districts cannot
discriminate against minority populations
6. Districts must be contiguous and as compact as possible, and cannot divide
county lines when drawing senatorial districts unless the law otherwise requires it
(Levitt, 2016).
Kentucky 
1. State legislative lines and congressional lines are drawn by state legislators and
subject to governor veto
2. Districts must comply with federal law which says each district must have about
an equal population and the Voting Rights Act, which says districts cannot
discriminate against minority populations.
3. Districts must be contiguous and compact, and county lines and communities of
interest must not be divided when drawing districts unless otherwise required by
law
4. The Franklin Circuit Court, the county the state capital of Frankfort, Kentucky is
in, has the sole authority to hear challenges to legislative district maps (Levitt,
2016).
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Chart 13 — Redistricting Comparative Matrix 1 
State Who draws the lines? Major redistricting process criteria 
Illinois -State Legislature, subject to governor
veto
-Based on population data from a federal census
taken every 10 years
-Federal law requires districts to have equal
population and not affect the voting power of racial
or ethnic minority groups
-Where possible, lines should be drawn to give
minorities influence to sway election toward their
chosen candidate
-Districts must be contiguous
Indiana -State Legislature, subject to governor
veto
--Based on population data from a federal census 
taken every 10 years 
-Federal law requires districts to have equal
population and not affect the voting power of racial
or ethnic minority groups
-Districts must be contiguous
Michigan -State Legislature, subject to governor
veto
-Based on population data from a federal census
taken every 10 years
-Federal law requires districts to have equal
population and not affect the voting power of racial
or ethnic minority groups
-Districts must be contiguous and separate as few
counties, town and city boundaries as possible
Wisconsin -State Legislature, subject to governor
veto
-Based on population data from a federal census
taken every 10 years
-Each State Senate district must be made up of three
State House districts
-Federal law requires districts to have equal
population and not affect the voting power of racial
or ethnic minority groups
--Districts must be contiguous and separate as few
counties, town and city boundaries as possible
Iowa -State Legislature votes on a plan,
which are subject to governor veto
-Lawmakers receive draft plans from a
nonpartisan advisory body and a
bipartisan advisory commission.
These bodies present potential district
maps and the Legislature votes to
approve them or not
-Federal law requires districts to have equal
population and not affect the voting power of racial
or ethnic minority groups
---Districts must be contiguous and compact
-Districts must separate as few counties, town and
city boundaries as possible
-Where possible, State House districts should be
contained within State Senate districts, and both
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should be contained within congressional districts 
Missouri -In the House, each party’s
congressional district committee picks
two members for each congressional
district (which must not share the
same state legislative district) and the
governor selects one per district per
party
-In the Senate, each major party’s state
party committee selects 10 members
and the governor selects 5 per party
from that pool
-A plan must have support from 70
percent of commissioners to pass.
-Based on population data from a federal census
taken every 10 years
-Federal law requires districts to have equal
population and not affect the voting power of racial
or ethnic minority groups
---Districts must be contiguous and compact
-County lines must not be divided when drawing
senatorial districts unless otherwise required by law
Kentucky -State Legislature, subject to governor
veto
-Based on population data from a federal census
taken every 10 years
-Federal law requires districts to have equal
population and not affect the voting power of racial
or ethnic minority groups
-Districts must be contiguous and compact
-County lines and communities of interest must not
be divided when drawing districts unless otherwise
required by law
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Chart 14 — Redistricting Comparative Matrix 2 
State In the case of redistricting 
impasse 
Public input 
Illinois -8-member backup 
commission draws the lines. If 
they can’t agree, Secretary of 
State randomly selects one 
person from a pool of two
(one from each Party). This 
person breaks the tie.
-Redistricting committees hold 
at least one public hearing in 
one of four geographic districts
Indiana -5-member backup 
commission draws the lines
-Public hearing schedules are 
put together by the Senate 
majority leader to receive 
public input into district lines
Michigan -State Supreme Court has sole 
authority to hear any 
challenges to either state or 
congressional districts
-Public hearings are scheduled 
from both legislative houses
Wisconsin -Federal courts are responsible 
for imposing a redistricting 
plan in the event of a 
legislative impasse
-No meetings, hearings held
Iowa -The state Supreme Court has 
the sole appellate jurisdiction 
to hear challenges regarding 
the drawn districts
-After the first draft is 
submitted by the bipartisan 
commission, a public copy is 
released and the commission is 
obliged to hold at least three 
public hearings in different 
areas of the state
Missouri -State Supreme Court has the 
authority to choose six state 
appellate judges to draw the 
lines
-At least three public input 
hearings must be held, and at 
least one of these must be after 
the commission submits their 
first plan draft
Kentucky -The Franklin Circuit Court 
has the sole authority to hear 
challenges to state legislative 
district maps
-No meetings, hearings held
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Obviously the partisan distribution between branches and within the legislative branch 
has a major impact on the likelihood of the legislature agreeing to a map which the governor will 
sign. Divided government often leads to an impasse. Unified government usually means the 
majority party draws the map to their advantage, which happened in Illinois and all the other 
states where the map is driven by the legislative branch.  
The following timelines show the history of partisanship in Illinois and surrounding states from 
1992-2013:  
Figure 17 
Illinois13 
Indiana14 
*In 1997 and 1998, the State House was split.
Michigan15 
*In 1993 and 1994, the State House was split.
13 Illinois General Assembly, 2014 
14 Indiana General Assembly, 2014 
15 Michigan General Assembly,  
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Wisconsin16 
Iowa17 
*In 2005 and 2006, the State Senate was split.
Missouri18 
Kentucky19 
16 Wisconsin General Assembly, 2014 
17 Iowa General Assembly, 2014 
18 Missouri General Assembly, 2014 
19 Kentucky General Assembly, 2014 
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In Illinois, Democrats have generally been in the majority. Although they lost their 
trifecta in 2014 with the election of Governor Rauner, the State House of Representatives has 
been Democratic for all but two years since 1992 and both legislative chambers have been 
Democratic since 2003. Indiana has had a more varied history. From 1992 to 2004, the state was 
under a Democratic governor but a Republican Senate. In the State House, party control flipped 
four times between 1992 and 2004 before Republicans gained a trifecta in 2011. Michigan has 
had a party split since 1992, with the Republican party having a trifecta in 1996 and 1996, from 
1999 to 2002 and again from 2011 to the present. Wisconsin has seen a Republican shift, as 
many states did from 2010 and onward, but historically its governor and legislature have been 
split between the two parties. Iowan Republicans have done well in the State House, holding the 
majority from 1993 to 2006 and again from 2011 to the present, while Democrats have often 
held office as governor or in the State Senate. However, in Iowa the partisan distribution is less 
directly relevant because of the major role played by the nonpartisan Legislative Services 
Agency. Democrats in Missouri had a trifecta from 1993 to 2000 but since 2003, Republicans 
have held both legislative chambers. Finally, Kentucky, which was a Democratic trifecta state 
from 1992 until 1999, has since been split between parties, with Republicans often controlling 
the State Senate and Democrats in office as governor and state representatives. 
Studying these timelines, it seems clear that Illinois is one of the least varied between its 
surrounding states in terms of partisan history. It has historically either been mostly controlled by 
the Republicans or mostly controlled by Democrats, while a state like Indiana has had more 
frequent party turnover. States like Missouri and Kentucky, though once dominated by 
Democrats, have seemed in recent years to more evenly divide power between parties. Since 
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2014 they have been unified under Republican control. Though Missouri uses a bipartisan 
commission to draw its legislative lines, these commissions are partisan and selected by the 
legislature and the governor. Kentucky and Illinois have very similar redistricting methods. In 
Iowa, where lawmakers receive draft plans from a nonpartisan advisory body and a bipartisan 
advisory commission, the chambers have tended to be more evenly divided between the two 
parties than in Illinois. This could suggest that a separate, bipartisan commission might help with 
partisanship in Illinois, but again, even states like Kentucky, Indiana, Michigan and Wisconsin, 
which have redistricting methods similar to Illinois, have had more varied legislatures than 
Illinois. Given the data, there does not seem to be conclusive evidence that a separate 
commission would change the party makeup in the state legislature.  
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Local “Employee Empowerment Zones” 
An “employee empowerment zone”, as Governor Rauner calls them, is essentially a 
right-to-work zone at the local level. Right-to-work laws say no employee can be obliged to join 
or not join a union as an employment condition, which means employees could still benefit from 
union negotiated benefits without having to pay dues to be members of that union (Garcia, 
2015). States with right-to-work laws still require contracts to cover all workers, not just union 
employees (“Right to Work Laws”, 2016). Governor Rauner says creating these “employee 
empowerment zones” in which employees could choose whether or not to join a union would 
make Illinois more attractive to businesses (Rauner, 2014, p. 9). Other advocates for right-to-
work states say this creates faster job growth. According to a National Institute for Labor 
Relations Research analysis of Bureau of Labor Statistics job growth data, in the 24 right-to-
work states private-sector job growth was at 9.7 percent from 2005-2015, a nearly 3 percentage 
point lead over the national average (National Institute for Labor Relations Research, 2016).  
There is a perception that the state of Illinois is burdened with a large number of state 
employees, but compared to the surrounding states, Illinois has the smallest number of full-time 
state employees (FTEs) per 10,000 people. In fact, of all 50 states, Illinois has the second-to-
smallest number of state employees per capita20:  
20 States With Most Government Employees: Totals and Per Capita Rates. (2014). Retrieved 
February 11, 2017, from http://www.governing.com/gov-data/public-workforce-salaries/states-
most-government-workers-public-employees-by-job-type.html 
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Figure 18 
Chart 15 
State State Gov. FTE Employment State FTEs Per 10K Population 
Kentucky 44,292 100 
Missouri 55,890 92 
Iowa 25,907 83 
Wisconsin 33,321 68 
Michigan 67,024 58 
Indiana 30,223 49 
Illinois 63,199 46 
(All data from States With Most Government Employees: Totals and Per Capita Rates, 2014) 
100 
(Figure below via National Institute for Labor Relations Research, 2016)21 
21 The National Institute for Labor Relations Research is an organization that advocates for right-to-work 
laws, and refers to non-RTW states as “forced-unionism” states.  
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Figure 19 
According to the American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC), from 2003-2013 right-to-
work states also had more gross state product growth compared to non-right-to-work states (58.8 
percent to 44.3 percent) and more personal income growth (57.9 percent to 45.8 percent) 
(Wilterdink, 2016)22.  
Governor Rauner’s proposal would be to allow establishment of “employee 
empowerment zones” in any county in the state. The Turnaround Agenda states:  
22 It should be noted that ALEC is a strongly conservative non-profit organization which advocates a series of 
policies for the states. 
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“An employee empowerment zone could be established either (i) by ordinance or 
resolution adopted by the governing board or council of the local government or (ii) by 
referendum proposed by petitions signed by at least 5 percent of registered voters in the 
jurisdiction. The proponents would decide whether the employee empowerment zone 
would apply to public sector employees, private sector employees, or both” (Rauner, 
2014, p. 9).  
In a February 2015 memo to state legislators, Governor Rauner said he wants state unions 
to operate more like federal unions, saying “government can not force its employees to 
participate in or fund labor union activities that they do not support” (Miller, 2015). Union 
supporters maintain that right-to-work states usually show lower wages for workers, fewer 
benefits, and less protection rights of workers.  
Figure 2023 
23Figure above from Governor Rauner’s slide presentation included in a February 2015 memo to state legislators, 
(Miller, 2015) 
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The information in the images above may be factually correct, but responsible 
comparisons of public and private sector compensation take into account education level, fringe 
benefits, firm size and other job characteristics that impact pay. A study conducted through the 
American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research defines total compensation as both 
salary and benefits, and researchers Andrew Biggs and Jason Richwine point out that most 
economists reject the method used by Governor Rauner above of comparing public and private 
sector jobs in similar occupations because “when comparable occupations do exist, [one] cannot 
be sure that either the job requirements or the skills of the employees who fill those jobs are 
equal between sectors” (Biggs, Richwine, 2014, p. 6). In their study, they found that, when 
controlling for education and other factors affecting employment, most state employees suffer 
from a salary penalty but the fringe benefits state workers earn are still enough to make 
government work more attractive than the private sector. Additionally, among lower-educated 
workers the gap between public and private sector compensation is significantly in favor of the 
public sector employee. As education level increases, compensation swings in the other direction 
— highly educated state workers suffer from compensation penalties compared to similarly 
educated private sector workers:  
“[Public sector employees] with less than a high school education receive a total 
compensation premium of 22 percent; high school graduates receive a compensation 
premium of 19 percent; individuals with some college receive a premium of 13 percent; 
college graduates receive a premium of 2 percent; master’s degree holders a penalty of 3 
percent; professional degree holders a penalty of 17 percent; and PhDs a penalty of 18 
percent” (Biggs, Richwine, 2014, p. 46). 
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Figure 21 
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Figures 22 and 23 
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(All date in the above charts is from Biggs, Richwine, 2014) 
Opponents of right-to-work laws say they reduce the number of union employees which 
leads to pay reductions for employees. A 2014 study conducted by Robert Bruno, a professor of 
labor and employment relations at the University of Illinois, and Frank Manzo IV, the policy 
director of the Illinois Economic Policy Institute, found that these laws reduce worker income by 
an average of 3.2 percent, lower percentage of workers covered by a health insurance plan by 3.5 
percent and a pension plan by 3 percent and reduce union membership by 9.6 percent (Ciciora, 
2014). A 2015 study from Nera Economic Consulting also found that union members in private 
sector jobs throughout the nation fell from 16 percent in 1983 to seven percent in 2014. 
However, membership in RTW states has been lower than non-RTW states. In 2014, the study 
found, four percent of private sector employees in RTW states were union members while almost 
nine-percent were union members in non-RTW states (Eisenach, 2015, p. 4).  
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Figure 24 
Private Union Density (1983-2014) 
(Image, Eisenach, 2015, p. 19)24. 
24 Union membership has been steadily declining for decades. Right-to-work states have lower 
levels of union membership than non-right-to-work states.  
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In Texas and Oklahoma, which passed RTW laws in 1993 and 2001 respectively, union 
membership had already been declining but declined at an accelerated rate once the laws were 
passed.  
Figure 25 
Decline in Private Sector Union Density in Texas and Oklahoma (Five Years Before and 
After RTW) (Image below, Eisenach, 2015) 
In Michigan, where RTW was passed in 2012, the number of employees represented by 
unions declined by 25,000 within 3 years, dropping from 656,000 in 2013 down to 631,000, 
according to a 2015 news release from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. Union membership went 
down by even more, from 633,000 to 585,000 within the same time period. However, Indiana, 
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where RTW was also passed in 2012, experienced an increase in union membership from 2013 
to 2014. According to BLS data, union members went up by 50,000 — from 249,000 in 2013 to 
299,000 in 2014. The number of workers represented by unions went from 275,000 to 335,000 
during the same time period (Szal, 2015). Some attribute Indiana’s increase to an improved 
economy and say the effects of RTW can’t be seen yet.  
Uric Dufrene, a professor of finance at Indiana University Southeast, said the most 
significant part of those numbers is that the RTW law has not yet showed a significant decrease 
for union members and representation (Suddeath, 2015). Jeff Harris, communications director for 
the Indiana State AFL-CIO, attributed the growth to an increase in public projects in the state, 
such as the construction of Lucas Oil Stadium and Interstate 69 additions (Suddeath, 2015).  
The study by Bruno and Manzo also found that although right-to-work laws increase 
employment by an average of 0.4 percent, this is at the expense of labor force participation, 
which tended to fall at a rate of 0.5 percent (Ciciora, 2014). The two authors of this study did a 
hypothetical examination of what would happen if the state did adopt right-to-work laws. They 
found that the state’s labor income would decline by $12.3 billion, with federal income tax 
revenue falling by $4.8 billion and state income tax revenue falling by $500 million. Government 
assistance like food stamps and Earned Income Tax Credit benefits would increase by $440 
million in a year. The authors state:  
“The question for policymakers is whether a small increase in the employment 
rate is worth a significant decrease in total labor income, a considerable decline in 
state income tax revenues, an even larger drop in federal income tax revenues and 
an increased erosion of public budgets.” (Ciciora, 2014).  
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From this study, it seems the negative impact RTW laws would have on the economy and 
union membership would outweigh the slight increase to the employment rate.  
As a point of comparison, here is a complete list of right-to-work states. Of these states, only 
Wisconsin and Iowa are adjacent to Illinois. Missouri became a RTW state in 2017 when the 
governor switched from Democratic to Republican.  
 (image below from Eisenach, 2015, p. 11): 
Figure 26 
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Conclusion 
When Bruce Rauner set his sights on becoming governor of Illinois, he had ambitious 
goals for the state and its problems. Though his gubernatorial bid was successful, after more than 
two years in office his 44-point Turnaround Agenda has had little to no success, and his policies 
have been blocked by the Democrat-controlled legislature at every turn. Still, the businessman-
turned-politician remains committed to his insistence that Illinois needs to have a more business-
friendly environment. Originally advocating for 44 reforms for the state, the “Turnaround 
Agenda”, the governor now tends to focus on seven he believes will turn around the Illinois 
economy, and in many cases, he points to surrounding states as policy models. After researching 
each of Governor Rauner’s favored reforms — workers’ compensation reform, education reform, 
a property tax freeze, implementing term limits, pension reform, redistricting and creating local 
“employee empowerment zones” — and comparing them to surrounding states, it seems that 
while some items have merit and warrant consideration by lawmakers, for other reforms there is 
little evidence to conclude they could fix the problems they’re intended to solve, according to the 
governor’s plan.  
For workers’ compensation, Governor Rauner often points to Indiana’s system as an 
exemplar for Illinois. A 2016 Oregon Workers’ Compensation Premium Rate Ranking Summary 
placed Illinois’ premiums at 8th highest in the nation, and Indiana’s at 49th. However, upon 
studying Indiana’s Workers’ Compensation Act, it is clear that, while it seems to result in lower 
premiums for Indiana businesses, this comes at the expense of the employee. In Indiana, the 
American Medical Association “Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment" are the sole 
determinant in workers’ compensation cases, but the AMA Guides can only rate the impairment, 
not the disability, of an employee. The Guides, therefore, cannot judge how much an injury 
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actually impacts an employee’s job. Make no mistake, the Illinois Workers’ Compensation Act 
does need tweaking, as is clear from the fact that Illinois premiums are nearly double some of the 
surrounding states. Illinois introduces the AMA Guides as one of five determinants for workers’ 
compensation payouts, but when studying decisions made by the Workers’ Compensation 
Commission, one can see that oftentimes, an AMA impairment rating is not even introduced as 
evidence. This can lead to payouts being higher than they might otherwise be. Instead, the AMA 
Guides should be the primary (but not sole) determinant in these cases. If one of the four other 
factors significantly alters the context of the case, then those should be given heavier 
consideration. This could lead to lower payouts and alleviate the high costs of workers’ 
compensation on employers while still providing injured employees the chance to have higher 
payouts if other factors are significant in their case. 
In this report’s study of education reform, it was apparent that there exists a clear 
disparity between wealthy and poor school districts in Illinois. Rich districts have much greater 
resources and spend more per pupil and poor districts less, which is largely due to school 
district’s overreliance on property taxes. This is a regressive funding system that ultimately leads 
to Illinois having the worst funding gap between rich and poor districts in the country. Part of 
this can also be attributed to the flat income tax rate in Illinois, which, again, can be called 
regressive because it tends to affect the most those with the lowest incomes. The School Funding 
Reform Commission’s suggestion of establishing “a unique funding target (“adequacy”) for each 
district that reflects the particular needs of children in that district and will lead to improved 
outcomes for students” sounds like it could be a step in the right direction, but it’s still vague and 
doesn’t give much indication of how it would work beyond giving additional resources to 
students from low-income families, English language learners and those with disabilities. Until a 
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way to close the education funding gap is worked out and passed by lawmakers, Illinois students 
with the fewest resources and highest poverty will continue to receive the short end of the stick.  
This leads to a third key reform area of the governor’s — a property tax freeze. Because 
districts in Illinois get nearly 65 percent of funding from property taxes, a freeze on this revenue 
source could potentially wreak havoc on schools. Though the Quality Counts report ranked 
Illinois the second-highest in school funding of all the surrounding states, it is clear that Illinois 
contributes the smallest amount of money to school districts out of any surrounding states. Low 
poverty districts receive 19 percent more funding than high poverty districts. In Indiana, high 
poverty districts receive 12 percent more than low poverty districts, and in Michigan, low 
poverty districts receive 6 percent less. High poverty districts in Wisconsin get 6 percent more 
than low poverty districts and in Iowa, low poverty districts receive 4 percent less. Poor Missouri 
school districts are allocated 4 percent less than wealthy ones and in Kentucky, poor districts get 
11 percent more than their rich counterparts (Ushomirsky, Williams, 2015, p. 4).  
Much of this is due to the reliance on property taxes to primarily fund Illinois schools, 
but part of this could also be attributed to the used of average daily attendance, rather than 
enrollment, in determining part of general state aid funding in Illinois. Studies show that children 
from low income backgrounds are almost twice as likely to miss class than their wealthier peers 
(Nelson, 2014). Of the states surrounding Illinois. those that use enrollment, rather than 
attendance, to determine part of state aid to school districts are more likely to have more 
equitable funding between their poor and rich school districts. In order for Illinois school 
districts to remain functional under a property tax freeze, Governor Rauner and lawmakers 
would have to follow through on education funding reform and allocate more state money to 
school districts. The crux of the problem, of course, is where the state funding would be found. 
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The governor has not been entirely clear on the answer to this question, as has been the case with 
most of the reform commissions.  
The governor calls for legislative term limits as a fix to the longstanding political 
corruption in Illinois and to bring new ideas and fresh faces to Springfield and enhance the 
business environment. When studying the 15 states that already have term limits (of which 
Missouri and Michigan are the only Illinois-adjacent players), there doesn’t seem to be any 
correlation between adopting term limits and political corruption. Also, neither of the 
surrounding states with term limits is significantly better off in overall economic terms than 
Illinois.  
In 2015, poll and data analysis website FiveThirtyEight conducted a study of political 
corruptness in each state based on four factors. When an average of all four corruption rankings 
is taken, Illinois comes out on top as the most corrupt state against all those with legislative term 
limits (except Louisiana, which is missing one data point), but is trailed by just two points by 
Ohio. California, one of two states that have had legislative term limits for the longest period of 
time, is ranked second in corruption convictions out of all 50 states. The other, Maine, is ranked 
5th in a lack of stringent corruption laws. Based on this information, there also does not seem to 
be an obvious correlation between state corruption and fiscal condition. Although the two most 
corrupt states, Louisiana and Illinois, rank low financially, Maine, which is in the bottom fourth 
of corruption in states with term limits, is ranked 43rd in fiscal condition. Again, Maine has had 
term limits for the longest period of time than any other state except California.  
Illinois’ term-limited neighboring state of Michigan is in the bottom half of rankings for 
state financial condition. Missouri seems to fare better fiscally, achieving the 14th best financial 
state in the country, but again, with the data showing varying degrees of financial success and 
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anti-corruption, it is hard to say if this is due to term limits or not. Though this doesn’t mean 
term limits wouldn’t alleviate some of the corruption coming out of Springfield, the data 
suggests it wouldn’t be the fix Governor Rauner is touting.  
When it comes to pension reform, few would argue with Governor Rauner’s assertion 
that the state is in trouble. Illinois, ranked dead last in terms of unfunded pension liabilities in the 
country, is clearly in desperate need of reform when compared to surrounding states like 
Wisconsin (ranked 2nd), Iowa (ranked 13th) and Missouri (ranked 22nd). For years the state has 
shortened pension payments to provide budgetary relief. Had the state government been making 
proper contributions all along, instead of Illinois’ frequent practice of taking pension holidays, 
the unfunded liabilities would not have grown so large. Now, the Supreme Court has ruled that 
the benefits already promised cannot be  infringed on. When adjusting for inflation, liabilities 
increased by 450 percent from 1999 to 2013 (Furchtgott-Roth, 2016) and with a record $130 
billion in unfunded pensions, it seems that the standard proposal of increasing taxes and cutting 
spending cannot be relied upon to fix a problem of this magnitude. The remaining answer, short 
of repealing the constitutional provision requiring pension obligations to be met (which the 
governor has advocated), would be to change the obligations for new workers. Senator 
Cullerton’s consideration model or Governor Rauner’s 401k proposals, though not as secure for 
employees as the previous model for government pensions, seem to be the next best method for 
digging the state out of its pension hole.  
Governor Rauner wants to change how Illinois draws legislative districts, and he has 
endorsed the Independent Map Coalition proposal. This measure, if passed by voter referendum, 
would create an independent commission made up of 11 people who would bring a plan to the 
Secretary of State every redistricting year by June 30 for legislative and representative districts. 
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When studying redistricting methods and party makeup of surround state legislatures, there isn’t 
conclusive evidence that this reform would create a more evenly distributed party makeup. The 
Illinois State Legislature has historically either been mostly controlled by the Republicans or 
mostly controlled by Democrats, while a state like Indiana has had more frequent party turnover. 
States like Missouri and Kentucky, though once dominated by Democrats, have tended in recent 
years to more evenly divide power between parties and then more recently still, they changed to 
Republican-dominant. Though Missouri uses a bipartisan commission to draw its legislative 
lines, Kentucky and Illinois have very similar redistricting methods. In Iowa, where lawmakers 
receive draft plans from a nonpartisan advisory body and a bipartisan advisory commission, the 
chambers have tended to be more evenly divided between the two parties than in Illinois. This 
could suggest that a separate, bipartisan commission might help with partisanship in Illinois, but 
again, even states like Kentucky, Indiana, Michigan and Wisconsin, which have redistricting 
methods similar to Illinois, have had more varied legislatures than Illinois. Given the data, there 
does not seem to be conclusive evidence that a separate commission would change the party 
makeup in the state legislature.  
Creating local “employee empowerment zones”, also known as right-to-work laws, is 
another major item on Governor Rauner’s wishlist, but this policy has been shown to lead to 
reductions in worker pay, lower the percentage of workers covered by health insurance and with 
pension plans, and reduce union membership. In Texas and Oklahoma, which passed RTW laws 
in 1993 and 2001 respectively, union membership had already been declining but declined at an 
accelerated rate once the laws were passed. In Michigan, where RTW was passed in 2012, the 
number of employees represented by unions declined by 25,000 within 3 years, dropping from 
656,000 in 2013 down to 631,000, according to a 2015 news release from the Bureau of Labor 
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Statistics. Though this pattern didn’t hold in Indiana, where RTW was also passed in 2012. The 
Illinois neighbor experienced a 50,000 worker increase in union membership from 2013 to 2014. 
Right-to-work laws have been found to increase the overall state employment by an average of 
0.4 percent, but this is at the expense of labor force participation, which tended to fall at a rate of 
0.5 percent. One study even found that if Illinois adopted RTW laws, the state’s total labor 
income would decline by $12.3 billion, with federal income tax revenue falling by $4.8 billion 
and state income tax revenue falling by $500 million. Government assistance like food stamps 
and Earned Income Tax Credit benefits would increase by $440 million in a year (Ciciora, 2014). 
The benefits to employers would come at a cost to the economy as a whole.  
Many of the issues Governor Rauner has identified in his Turnaround Agenda are in 
desperate need of redress. The state is in financial distress. According to the 2016 Mercatus 
Center Ranking of States by Fiscal Condition, Illinois is 47th of all states and Puerto Rico on the 
basis of fiscal health in five separate categories. The state is 48th in terms of cash solvency, or 
having enough money to pay its bills. Illinois comes in 41st in budget solvency, or the ability to 
finance the fiscal year with the revenues it generates. Long-run solvency, being able to use assets 
to cover potential state emergencies and financial risks, puts the state second-to-last, and trust 
fund solvency — the level of debt in the state — comes in at 46th. Trust fund solvency includes 
pension liabilities, other postemployment benefits (OPEB) state debt. Of the five factors used in 
the report to measure a state’s financial condition, Illinois did the best in service-level solvency, 
which compares how high taxes, spending and revenue are compared to how much money 
people in the state make. Here, Illinois ranked 25th, but still — in no category was Illinois above 
average, and in four-fifths of the categories the state was in the bottom 10 rankings (Norcross, 
Gonzalez, 2016, 13, 15, 18, 25, 27).  
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People have been leaving the state in droves for years, with more than 100,000 people 
leaving in 2016, and Illinois has long been labeled one of the most politically corrupt states in the 
country. This is a part of what made Governor Rauner’s promise to “Shake up Springfield” so 
popular among voters. However, in practice is appears many of his policies would benefit 
businesses at the expense of workers. None of these proposals alone appear to provide the silver 
bullet to fix the state’s ills. Some, like term limits, do not appear to be clearly related to the 
problems with the state’s economy the governor claims they will solve.  
More immediately, the local property tax freeze would certainly address the high rate Illinois 
suffers, but it also would reduce the ability of local units of government, especially school 
districts, to address their needs, which are in part caused by the state’s failure to provide state 
funding. The budget impasse, which has not been helped by Governor Rauner’s refusal to sign a 
budget bill that doesn’t include term limits and a property tax freeze, has been a major detriment 
to many Illinois residents, and the state’s public schools, community colleges, universities, and 
social agencies. With the state under unprecedented financial duress, it would appear that some 
of the governor’s priorities are on reforms that won’t yield the desired results for Illinois citizens. 
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Appendix A 
Illinois Workers’ Compensation Case Studies   
In Zachary Johnson v Central Transport, 11WC41328, filed July 24, 2012: 
Zachary Johnson, a 28-year-old truck driver and loader for Central Transport, was 
inspecting a trailer before a trip on October 17, 2011 and was attempting to close 
the broken trailer door when it fell onto his right hand. His employers were 
notified and Johnson kept working. The next day, Johnson went to the doctor and 
got an x-ray that showed he had a closed right small finger metacarpal fracture. 
He was then inspected by Advanced Medical Specialists and placed on left-hand 
restricted work. By the end of November, x-rays showed his hand was getting 
better and he was released to full-duty on December 19th, 2011. Central Transport 
requested Johnson be examined by Dr. Cohen who said the injury would not 
permanently flare up in the cold (which Johnson claimed). In February 2012, 
Johnson was hired at a new job with JF Freight where he would be driving further 
and more often. Johnson said his hand hurt periodically, especially in the cold, 
driving over rough roads or hitting the gear shift. (Levenhagen, 2013, p. 6-8). On 
April 6, 2012 A Dr. Vender did an AMA Impairment exam on Johnson. Johnson 
told the doctor he had soreness and numbness still in his hand, and Dr. Vender 
found a 1 percent impairment to Johnson’s right hand, 7 percent impairment of his 
finger and 0 percent of his whole person. In WCC Arbitrator Thompson-Smith’s 
decision, she listed each of the five factors outlined in the Workers’ 
Compensation Act as follows:  
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1. The reported level of impairment: Dr. Vender’s rating was
submitted for evidence. Johnson did not submit a rating that
considered the AMA Guides.
2. The occupation of the injured employee: Johnson remains
employed as a truck driver and now drives even more than he did
before.
3. The age of the employee at the time of injury: Johnson was 28
years old, and because he is younger, the arbitrator decided his
PPD may not be as bad as an older individual’s would have been.
4. The employee’s future earning capacity: Arbitrator Thompson-
Smith concluded that there was nothing to suggest his future
earnings would be in any way impacted by the injury, and his
young age makes it likely he could have a long career as a truck
driver.
5. Evidence of disability shown through medical records: The
arbitrator said that the findings of Dr. Vender and Dr. Cohen
supported the claims of Johnson.
Arbitrator Thompson-Smith reiterated that no single factor is the sole determinant 
and decided Johnson had suffered a 10 percent permanent loss to his right hand 
(Levenhagen).   
In Frederick Williams v. Flexible Staffing, Inc., 11 WC 046390, filed July 24, 2012: 
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Frederick Williams, a 45-year-old welder employed at Flexible Staffing, had job duties 
including welding, carrying equipment, and cutting metal. He was working on a 400-
pound rail section on October 7, 2011 when the rail fell onto Williams’ hand. He felt pain 
and saw that his arm didn’t look right. His diagnosis was a distal biceps tendon rupture 
and he had surgery from a Dr. Arabindi on November 7, 2011 and received physical 
therapy from November 28th until February 8, 2012. On March 7th, 2012, Dr. Arabindi 
declared Williams to be at maximum medical improvement and noted he didn’t have 5 to 
10 degrees of full supination in his injured arm, meaning he wasn’t able to fully turn it so 
the palm of his hand was facing outward. Though Williams said he still didn’t have full 
strength in his arm, the doctor released him to full work duty on March 8th, 2012. He told 
Flexible Staffing he was released, but Flexible Staffing then told Williams he was no 
longer employed there. The employers then requested Williams be examined by Dr. Dr. 
Mark Levin who found that Williams could not fully extend his arm, this time unable to 
reach full supination or pronation (extension with the palm facing downward or inward). 
Dr. Levin gave Williams an AMA rating of 4 percent loss of the whole person or 5 
percent loss of his right arm. Williams testified that he still has pain every day as well as 
numbness and tingling, and he finds welding difficult.  
Arbitrator Thompson – Smith filed her decision taking the five factors of the Illinois 
Workers’ Compensation Act into account:  
1. Reported level of impairment: Thompson-Smith noted that Dr. Levin’s
AMA rating only determined impairment, not disability.
135 
2. Occupation of the injured employee: Williams’ job requires heavy work at
times, and therefore his award would be more than someone who does
light work.
3. Age of the employee: Thompson-Smith concluded Williams’ award
should be more because he is younger and will be living with his injury for
longer than an older person would have to
4. Employee’s future earning capacity: Though Williams’ was medically
released to his job, his future earnings may be affected because after his
time away recovering he was told he no longer had a job by Flexible
Staffing.
5. Evidence of disability corroborated by medical records: Williams’
complaints of pain, numbness and tingling were supported by Dr.
Arabindi, as well as the injury’s permanence, since Dr. Arabindi
concluded at maximum medical improvement Williams still lacked five to
10 degrees of supination in his injured arm.
Given all five factors together, Arbitrator Thompson-Smith decided Williams sustained a 
30 percent loss of his right arm (Levenhagen, 2013, p. 8-11). 
In Dorris v. Continental Tire, 11 WC 46624, filed in 2012:  
Dorris sustained an injury to his left forearm and wrist while trying to release a caught 
tire from a mold in September of 2011. An MRI found he had a peripheral triangular 
fibrocartilage complex (TFCC) tear and in December he had surgery to repair it. Dorris 
returned to work with restrictions on December 12, 2011, beginning physical therapy 
simultaneously, and was released on May 7, 2012 by his surgeon. Dorris claimed at this 
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time he was 80 percent back to his pre-injury condition but he had sufficient strength and 
range of motion. During the case, Dorris said he still had pain in his left wrist and 
forearm, and although he was able to return to his same position at work, he had to alter 
his methods to make up for the pain in his hand.  
The arbitrator made their decision pursuant to the five factors noted in the Illinois 
Workers’ Compensation Act:  
1. Reported level of impairment: Dr. David Brown, Dorris’ surgeon,
reported 6 percent upper extremity impairment. This rating was
performed at the request of Continental Tire and nothing shows the
petitioner presenting this impairment rating
2. Occupation of the injured employee: The arbitrator noted Dorris
was able to return to his job and that it was relatively labor
intensive, concluding that is PPD would be more than an
individual with a lighter workload.
3. Age of the employee: Dorris was 38 at the time of injury, which
the arbitrator decided made his PPD more extensive than an older
individual because he would have to live with the injury for longer.
4. Employee’s future earning capacity: The arbitrator did not find
evidence of any diminished future earning capacity.
5. Evidence of disability corroborated by medical records: The
petitioner’s claim of pain in left wrist and forearm was supported
by his medical records, which noted a loss of grip strength and
range of motion.
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Using these five factors, the arbitrator granted a 13 percent loss of use in the injured hand 
(Tomaso, 2014, p. 17-18).  
In Arscott v. Con-Way Freight, Inc., 12 WC 3876, filed in 2013: 
Arscott is a truck driver who sustained an injury to his left knee when leaving his 
tractor. An MRI showed this to be a torn left meniscus, which was surgically 
repaired on May 22, 2012. Arscott was released to return to full duty on July 2, 
2012, and declared to be at maximum medical improvement on August 7, 2012. 
During the case, Arscott said he was able to perform his job duties and perform an 
exercise program, but said he sometimes needed over-the-counter medication  
The arbitrator noted the following based on the 5 factors in the Illinois Workers’ 
Compensation Act:  
1. Reported level of impairment: Dr. Sanjay Patari, who was hired by
Con-Way Freight, Inc., found a 20 percent impairment of Arscott’s
leg or an 8 percent impairment to his whole person. The
arbitrator’s decision doesn’t show an impairment rating given by
the petitioner.
2. Occupation of the injured employee: The petitioner was able to
return to his regular duties.
3. Age of the employee: Arscott was 57 years old at the time of the
injury, but the impact of this age was not indicated in the decision.
4. Employee’s future earning capacity: The arbitrator found no
evidence to suggest a diminished future earning capacity.
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5. Evidence of disability corroborated by medical records: The
petitioner complained of continuing knee pain, which the arbitrator
noted as “generally consistent with the surgery performed.”
Using these factors, a 20 percent loss of the leg was awarded (Tomaso).  
In each of these cases, the impairment rating given by the treating physician was not given any 
more weight than the other four factors the arbitrator considered, and in each case, the 
impairment loss awarded by the arbitrator exceeded the impairment rating supplied by the 
doctor.  Based on this, if the physician impairment rating was the sole determining factor, 
payouts to workers would tend to be lower.  
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Appendix B 
A detailed breakdown of the Wisconsin school funding tier system 
If a district has 500 members, spends $11,000 per member, and values each member at 
$200,000;  
1. The Tier-1 calculation will use 500 members, $1,000 of the per-
member cost, and the same value-per-member cost of $200,000
2. The Tier-2 calculation uses 500 members and $7,000 of the per-
member total, with a value-per-member cost of $200,000
3. Tier-3 uses 500 members, the remainder of the per-member cost
($3,000) and the same $200,000 value-per-member cost (State of
Wisconsin, 2016).
Here is a more detailed breakdown of the three tier systems:  
Tier-1: 
This calculation involves a state-determined “primary cost ceiling” (State of Wisconsin, 
2016) of $1,000 per school district member for districts that have a value per member that 
meets the “primary per-member guaranteed valuation”. The state per-member primary 
guarantee is the same percentage of the $1,000 primary cost that must be paid by the 
district’s taxpayers . This example is provided by the State of Wisconsin Department of 
Public Instruction:  
“If a district's per-member value is $200,000, and the state per-member primary 
guarantee is $2,000,000, then the district value ($200,000) is 10 percent of the 
state primary guarantee ($2,000,000). For this district, its tax base would be 
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required to fund 10 percent of $1,000 per-member cost, or $100. The state aid for 
this district at the primary level would be the difference between $1,000 and 
$100, or $900 per member” (State of Wisconsin, 2016). 
(Image, State of Wisconsin, 2016) 
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Tier-2 
This calculation provides aid between $1,000 and the state determined “secondary 
cost ceiling” (State of Wisconsin, 2016) for districts with value-per-member up to 
the secondary per-member guaranteed valuation. State law says the secondary 
cost ceiling level is 90 percent of the state average shared cost per member, so the 
secondary cost ceiling changes year to year, which is why secondary cost is 
defined as above $1,000 but below the secondary cost ceiling. The percentage of 
the per-member cost a district’s taxpayers are obliged to pay is equal to the 
percentage the district’s per-member value is of the state’s per-member secondary 
guarantee. This example is provided by the State of Wisconsin Department of 
Public Instruction:  
“If a district's per-member value is $200,000, and the state per-member 
secondary guarantee is $800,000, then the district value ($200,000) is 25 
percent of the state secondary guarantee ($800,000). For this district, its 
tax base would be required to fund 25 percent of the secondary cost. So if 
the secondary cost ceiling was $8,000, the amount of secondary cost in 
this tier is $7,000 ($8,000 minus the $1,000 already used in the primary 
tier). This district's tax base would be required to fund 25 percent of 
$7,000 of per-member cost, or $1,750. The state aid for this district at the 
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secondary level would be the difference between $7,000 and $1,750, or 
$5,250 per member” (State of Wisconsin, 2016). 
(Image, State of Wisconsin, 2016) 
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Tier-3:  
This calculation provides aid above the state’s secondary cost ceiling for districts 
that have a value per member up to the state “tertiary per-member guaranteed 
valuation” (State of Wisconsin, 2016). The tertiary per-member guaranteed 
valuation is 100 percent of the statewide average per-member value, per state law. 
The portion of the tier-3 per ember cost required to be paid by a district’s 
taxpayers is equal to the percentage the district’s per-member value is of the state 
per-member tertiary guarantee (State of Wisconsin, 2016). This example is 
provided by the State of Wisconsin Department of Public Instruction:  
“If a district's per-member value is $200,000, and the state per-member 
tertiary guarantee is $400,000, then the district value ($200,000) is 50 
percent of the state secondary guarantee ($400,000). For this district, its 
tax base would be required to fund 50 percent of the tertiary cost. With the 
secondary cost ceiling at $8,000, the amount of tertiary cost in this tier 
would be cost in excess of $8,000, or $3,000 in this case. This district's tax 
base would be required to fund 50 percent of $3,000 of per-member cost at 
this tier, or $1,500. The state aid for this district at the tertiary level would 
be the difference between $3,000 and $1,500, or $1,500 per member” 
(State of Wisconsin, 2016).  
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(Image, State of Wisconsin, 2016)  
Combining all the tier funding from the examples, this district’s total state school funding 
aid would be $7,650: “This district's cost in the formula is $5,500,000 ($11,000 x 500). 
Equalization Aid funds $3,825,000 ($7,650 x 500). The local property tax funds 
$1,675,000 ($11,000 - $7,650 x 500)” (State of Wisconsin, 2016).  
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